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As the Internet of Things (IoT) continues to expand, there is a growing ne-
cessity for improved techniques to authenticate the identity of wireless transmitters
to prevent unauthorized network access. In this dissertation, we develop a series
of physical-layer authentication, or radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting, techniques
which utilize methods from deep learning to train convolutional and recurrent neural
network models to verify the identity of wireless transmitters which meet the IEEE
802.15.4 standard.
First, we develop a technique which utilizes a convolutional neural network
(CNN) to identify or verify the identity of a transmitter from which a time-domain
complex baseband signal was recorded. This technique relies on an extensive pre-
processing sequence to remove sources of potential bias and trivial features from the
received waveforms, and derives an estimated error signal from each recording from
which the CNN learns discriminatory features. We demonstrate the effectiveness of
the technique on a set of seven off-the-shelf ZigBee devices recorded outside in an
urban environment, as well as in a laboratory environment with artificial noise over
a wide-range of signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs).
Next, we train a series of models which utilize both convolutional and recurrent
elements to improve the performance of the previous technique in the presence
of high levels of noise and expand the evaluation to a larger set of twenty-five
devices. We evaluate several realistic scenarios, including the performance in typical
multipath environments and the ability to correctly reject previously unseen devices.
In order to justify the proposed pre-processing sequence, we present experimental
results that demonstrate weaknesses in fingerprint verification classifiers in which
frequency synchronization is not performed. Finally, we present a simple technique
to reduce the amount of memory required for a collection of fingerprint models by
up to 95% without loss of performance.
To further enhance the security of the trained fingerprint models, we pro-
pose a generative adversarial network (GAN) architecture and training procedure
to provide additional training examples for the classifiers. We show that fingerprint
classifiers that are trained exclusively on real devices cannot reliably reject GAN-
generated signals. Furthermore, we illustrate that augmenting the training process
of the fingerprint models with GAN-generated signals reduces this vulnerability,
even if the GAN used for training and inference are different.
Finally, we assess the practicality of transferring an RF fingerprint model from
one receiver to another. Experimentally, we demonstrate significant degradation in
classification performance when a fingerprint model is learned using signals recorded
on one receiver and evaluated using signals recorded on another receiver. First, we
show that generalization may be improved by including multiple receivers in the
training process. Then, we develop a calibration procedure whereby models learned
on a single receiver can be transferred without alteration to another receiver by
learning a transformation function, implemented as a residual neural network, to
model the variations between the two receivers. We perform several experiments
with ten commercial receivers to confirm the effectiveness of the technique under
realistic constraints.
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Recently, the availability of high-speed graphics processing units (GPUs), large
datasets, and open-source software libraries that implement machine learning algo-
rithms has led to a surge of research in deep neural networks, largely concentrated
within the domains of computer vision and natural language processing. Notably, a
number of deep learning-based techniques have been developed to address common
privacy and security concerns, such as user authentication, by learning biomet-
ric features. These features, which may include fingerprints, irises, and faces, are
specific to the user and are much more difficult to replicate than a compromised
personal identification number (PIN) or password, which can simply be entered by
an unauthorized user to gain access to a system.
Despite the overwhelming amount of research being done within these domains,
relatively little work has been published that applies deep learning algorithms to
another critical area of security: wireless communications. Currently, authentication
protocols in wireless security rely on the secrecy of keys comprised of a sequence
of bits. Unlike biometric data, which is difficult to reliably spoof, a bit-level key,
if compromised, could be reproduced exactly and exploited to gain unauthorized
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access to or privileges within a network while avoiding detection.
Analogous to the transition toward the analysis of human biometric data for
security purposes, this dissertation seeks to apply deep learning algorithms to per-
form radio frequency (RF) fingerprinting, which is the use of physical-layer charac-
teristics in a transmitted waveform to authenticate the identity of a transmitting
device. Specifically, our work aims to train deep neural networks on received com-
munications signals to identify the patterns which are unique to each transmitter
and create a classifier to distinguish a target transmitter from all others.
Our work targets devices which implement the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol [1], a
standard which defines the physical layer and media access control (MAC) layer for
low data-rate wireless personal area networks (WPANs), commonly implemented in
devices which comprise the Internet of Things (IoT). These devices, such as those
that implement the ZigBee standard [2], tend to be low cost and manufactured by a
wide variety of companies. As such, we expect and demonstrate that the variability
between devices is sufficiently high to distinguish them, even those of the exact same
model.
1.2 Problem Statement
Our goal is to be able to verify whether or not the identity of a transmit-
ting device matches the identity that it claims using only the characteristics present
in the transmitted waveform, with no other prior knowledge except the commu-
nications standard, in this case IEEE 802.15.4. In addition, we aim to assess the
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applicability of such techniques in several real-world scenarios, such as operating in
noisy multipath channels and sharing fingerprint models amongst a set of receivers.
In doing so, we permit the use of a two-factor authentication scheme whereby
a device may verify its identity through use of a secret bit-level key in addition to
its RF fingerprint. To overcome this scheme and effectively spoof a trusted device,
an adversary would have to compromise the secret bit-level key and mimic the
physical waveform that would be produced by the trusted device to a high degree of
accuracy. As we will show, even devices of the same model have sufficient variation
in their waveforms to distinguish them. An attack would thus require a sophisticated
approach to learn and transmit a waveform that is indistinguishable from the trusted
device.
In addition, such techniques could allow for a receiver to detect if the authen-
tication keys it is using have been compromised and respond accordingly. As soon
as a packet is received that passes the bit-level authentication, but fails the RF fin-
gerprint verification beyond a certain threshold, the receiver can infer that its keys
have been compromised and should no longer be trusted. Instead, the receiver can
ignore all transmissions from the now-compromised address until a new pair of keys
has been generated. If the RF fingerprinting algorithm has a low enough failure
rate, new keys could even be generated and trusted on the fly by accepting them
only if they were generated by a device that passes the RF fingerprint validation.
In practice, this would require a trade-off between false positive and true positive
rates for the classifier that would need to be set carefully depending on the needs
of the application.
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Our work presents two classification problems:
1. The verification problem seeks to confirm whether or not a given transmission
originates from a particular device. In a practical setting, a device may be
verified against the fingerprint model corresponding to the source address
claimed in the transmission. This is a binary one-vs-all classification problem,
and performance may be evaluated using receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) and precision-recall (P-R) curves. For verification, we train a single
neural network model per device to confirm the fingerprint of that device
against all others.
2. The identification problem seeks to select which device among those in the
training set produced a given transmission. This is a multi-class problem and
performance may be evaluated using confusion matrices and correct classifi-
cation rates. For identification, we develop a single neural network for each
experiment to assign transmissions to devices in the training set. This prob-
lem is less applicable to a practical cybersecurity context since it is unlikely
that a particular untrusted device is seen during training, but better demon-
strates the degree of uniqueness within the population of devices.
In order to solve the verification problem, each target device requires a neural
network that distinguishes that particular device from all others. In a practical
context, it is cumbersome to manually tune the architecture and hyperparameters
for each target device. Instead, we focus on developing a single network model and
training procedure that can be effectively implemented for each device.
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Conversely, the identification problem is a classic example of a multi-class
classification problem, for which one approach is to use a single neural network to
assign a recorded signal to any one of the devices in the training set.
We define three classes of adversaries who may attempt to claim the identity of
an authorized device within a network to fool a receiver into unknowingly performing
an unauthorized task:
• Weak adversaries simply transmit with another device, possibly of the ex-
act same model, and modify the data bits that are transmitted to claim the
identity of a trusted device. Such an adversary has compromised bit-level cre-
dentials, but makes no sophisticated attempts to replicate the RF fingerprint.
• Intermediate adversaries perform the same attack as a weak adversary, but
also change high-level characteristics of their transmitted waveform that are
assumed to be uniform throughout the duration of a packet, such as the exact
center frequency, power level, or transmit location, in an effort to appear more
similar to a trusted device.
• Strong adversaries strengthen their attack further by performing fine-grained
adjustments to their transmitted waveform on a sample-by-sample basis to
appear as similar as possible to an authorized device. Such an adversary may
have developed an accurate model of the RF front-end of the target device by
listening to its transmissions.
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1.3 Contributions
The first two techniques we present attempt to detect weak and intermediate
adversaries. Our first method develops a data pre-processing procedure to remove
certain features from recorded wireless signals that may permit trivial classifica-
tion, and then trains a convolutional neural network (CNN) to distinguish complex
baseband error signals from different devices [3]. We define the complex baseband
error signal as the additional signal beyond the ideal waveform for a particular bit
sequence. Since CNNs operate on fixed-size data, we develop a technique to split
received signals into fixed-size windows, classify the signal contents of each window
using the CNN, then combine the outputs from all windows within each transmis-
sion to form a final classification. We demonstrate the performance of this method
on data from a set of seven commercially-available devices recorded in a laboratory
environment with simulated additive noise, as well as on data collected outdoors in
an urban environment.
Our second method removes the need to manually split and recombine sig-
nals through use of a recurrent neural network (RNN) structure known as a long
short-term memory (LSTM) [4] which operates over the time dimension [5]. This
method also improves upon the pre-processing sequence and demonstrates better
performance at lower signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) than previously. Additionally,
we develop a simulated multipath model based on published measurements from
ZigBee transmitters and demonstrate that the sort of weak multipath effects that
are likely to be present in a WPAN minimally impact classifier performance, pro-
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vided that they are accounted for during the training process. This work also shows
that the verification networks generalize well to withheld devices, those that were
not seen during training, by correctly classifying them as an unauthorized device.
Another experiment emphasizes the importance of frequency synchronization during
pre-processing by showing that a network trained on unsynchronized transmissions
performs well in the presence of weak adversaries, but is vulnerable to an interme-
diate adversary that simply frequency-shifts their transmissions. Finally, we show
that a reduced memory model, in which all verification networks share 95% of their
weights, is possible without adversely impacting performance.
Next, we modify the generative adversarial network (GAN) formulation intro-
duced by Goodfellow et al. [6] for use with the RF fingerprinting problem [7]. In
doing so, we are able to train a model of each transmitter to produce an unlimited
amount of data for training the verification models. These GAN models represent
the strong adversary which has precise sample-by-sample control over their output
waveform. We show experimentally that the GAN models are able to successfully
fool verification networks which were trained exclusively on real devices. Finally, we
demonstrate that using a GAN to augment the training dataset for the verification
networks can successfully defend against this vulnerability with high probability,
even if the GAN architecture and dataset used for training are different than those
used for evaluation.
Finally, we analyze the impact of the receiver on classifier performance [8].
The prior work has assumed that the same receiver is used for training and testing
and that the verification models will never need to be adapted for use with another
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receiver. This work investigates that assumption on a collection of ten commercially-
available receivers. First, we demonstrate that training a model on one receiver and
then testing it on another results in significantly degraded verification performance.
We propose two methods to reduce this effect. The first simply requires training the
verification networks on data recorded using multiple receivers. We show that this
provides significant improvement, particularly at high SNRs. Next, we introduce a
calibration procedure whereby a model that has already been trained using a single
receiver may be deployed to new receivers by learning a residual neural network
(ResNet) [9] transformation for each receiver to adjust the complex baseband sig-
nal input prior to classification by the verification network. We demonstrate that
this approach reduces the error when switching receivers by 32.09% to 62.99%, de-
pending on the SNR. We then present the results of several experiments using the
proposed transform method, including training with several virtual receivers that
are simulated using the learned transformations, and replacing the original training
receiver with another that is augmented by its own transformation network.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 sum-
marizes related work that seeks to solve the RF fingerprinting problem. Chapter
3 provides background information on the IEEE 802.15.4 standard and the sort of
transmitter imperfections that make it possible to perform fingerprinting. Chapter
4 introduces a CNN technique for solving both the identification and verification
problems. Chapter 5 improves upon the previous technique with enhanced pre-
processing and the addition of RNN components and provides further analysis of
the performance in realistic scenarios. Chapter 6 introduces a GAN approach to
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improving the security of trained fingerprint verification models. Chapter 7 ana-
lyzes the ability a fingerprint to be used with a receiver other than the one used for
training and develops a ResNet technique for adapting signals from a new receiver
for use with the original model. Finally, Chapter 8 provides concluding remarks and
possible future directions for the work.
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Chapter 2: Related Work
A large amount of prior work has been conducted on the RF fingerprinting
problem, much of it focused on techniques which require domain-specific expert
knowledge to carefully develop hand-crafted feature vectors on which to classify the
transmitters using standard approaches from machine learning. We review these
techniques in Section 2.1.
Other authors have taken a neural network approach for feature extraction
and/or classification. Some of these models follow a hybrid approach, combining
hand-crafted feature vectors with neural network classifiers. In contrast, our meth-
ods follow a more data-driven approach and utilize neural network models to perform
both feature extraction and classification. Recently, there has been great interest in
applying neural network models to the RF fingerprinting problem, due at least in
part to its inclusion in the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
Radio Frequency Machine Learning Systems (RFMLS) program [10]. Techniques
based at least in part on neural network models are reviewed in Section 2.2.
Until recently, the application of neural network models to the RF domain
has been relatively limited. However, the advent of deep learning techniques, which
have demonstrated groundbreaking performance in a wide-array of classification
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problems, particularly in the domains of image, video, and audio classification [11–
13], has motivated a number of applications of neural network models to other
problems in the RF domain. This work, though not directly aimed toward solving
the RF fingerprinting problem, provides useful insights and is summarized in Section
2.3.
2.1 RF Fingerprint Classifiers Based on Hand-Crafted Feature
Vectors
A commonly used feature extraction technique for WPAN devices such as Zig-
Bee and Z-Wave is to divide a fixed header portion of the signal, such as the preamble
or synchronization header (SHR), into a number of equal-sized regions and compute
statistics such as variance, skewness, and kurtosis on the instantaneous amplitude,
phase, or frequency signal in each region [14–17]. Classification algorithms based
on multiple discriminant analysis (MDA), maximum likelihood estimation (MLE),
and random forests can then be trained to learn a distribution of feature vectors
from the data in order to distinguish transmissions from different devices. Previous
work has shown that phase features are the most useful for distinguishing ZigBee
devices [16] which implement the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol.
Alternatively, methods have been proposed which seek to classify based on
patterns in time-frequency representations of measured signals. Yuan et al. devel-
oped a classifier which selects features from the Hilbert-Huang transform (HHT)
of the transient portion of eight emitters, then uses principal component analysis
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(PCA) to reduce the dimensionality of the feature space before training a support
vector machine (SVM) classifier [18]. Similarly, Ali et al. distinguish Bluetooth
transmissions from 20 cell phones by creating a set of hand-crafted features directly
from the transient portion of the signal, including features from the HHT of the
transient, then performing classification using decision trees, SVMs, and linear dis-
criminant analysis (LDA) [19]. Building off of a number of techniques which utilize
only the rising transient of the signals for fingerprinting, Yang et al. show that
adding features computed from the falling transient and a synchronization portion
of the transmission can boost the accuracy of the classifier beyond that achieved
using only the rising transient [20].
Bertoncini et al. created a feature vector by combining features from three
different methods: dynamic wavelet fingerprinting (DWFP), wavelet packet decom-
position (WPD), and higher order statistics of the recorded signal [21]. They then
demonstrated that a SVM classifier can be trained to reliably distinguish trans-
missions from 146 radio frequency identification (RFID) tags recorded in a high
SNR environment. Xie et al. likewise combine wavelet transform techniques for
multiresolution analysis with a SVM classifier to perform fingerprinting, but they
additionally apply a coherent integration technique, typically used in radar sys-
tems, as a denoising algorithm prior to feature extraction [22]. They show that
this denoising technique significantly enhances the performance of the classifier on
low SNR signals. Similarly, Zhou et al. demonstrated that averaging the recorded
time-series over a repeated symbol sequence improves the ability of the fingerprint
classifier to generalize to signals recorded over a longer span of time [23]. In their
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case, they showed that the averaging technique allowed fingerprints generated from
signals recorded 18 months prior to successfully be used to classify a population of
50 ZigBee devices with 99.71% accuracy using a Bayesian approach and modeling
the signals with multivariate Gaussian distributions.
Huang and Zheng demonstrated an ability to distinguish seven time-division
multiple access (TDMA) satellite terminals with quadrature phase shift keying
(QPSK) by measuring the error in the constellation of the steady state portion
of the received signal [24]. Their method then uses LDA and subclass discriminant
analysis (SDA) to separate the constellation error signals into each of the seven
classes. Ali et al. showed that statistics of the error vector can be used to distin-
guish real base stations from fake base stations due to the quality of components
and digital predistortion techniques used in real base stations to correct power am-
plifier nonlinearity [25]. They demonstrate that by measuring the kurtosis of the
distribution of errors, they can distinguish the error due to nonlinearity, which is
much higher in the fake base stations generated using software defined radios, from
random noise.
Brik et al. demonstrated a technique that trains SVM and k-nearest neighbor
(kNN) classifiers to identify IEEE 802.11 transmitters by using high-level statistics
of their modulation error as features [26]. Their feature vector includes the follow-
ing five metrics: frequency error, phase error, magnitude error, distance between
in-phase/quadrature (I/Q) origins of the ideal and measured signals, and correla-
tion of I/Q values between the ideal and measured preamble sequences. Pan et
al. developed a technique specifically for TDMA signals to assess whether adjacent
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time slots within a TDMA frame belong to the same transmitter by measuring the
carrier phase continuity between adjacent bursts and used their technique to en-
hance predictions given by the algorithm developed by Brik et al. [27]. Candore et
al. used a similar set of modulation error statistics as features, but built a set of
14 weak single-variable classifiers by learning the approximate probability distribu-
tion of each feature for each device, then assigning a transmission to the class with
the highest likelihood for the observed feature [28]. Finally, a strong classifier was
demonstrated by weighting the output of the weak classifiers according to weights
derived by the performance on a validation set. Experimental results showed strong
performance at identifying six radios using differential QPSK (DQPSK) modulation.
Peng et al. showed that cluster centers in an image called a “differential
constellation trace figure,” which is derived from the signal, could be used along with
frequency offset, modulation offset, and I/Q offset to build a lightweight classifier
for use with ZigBee devices [29]. However, they also demonstrated an increase in
the error rate by more than a factor of two when the technique is used in non-line-
of-sight conditions and also when the test signals are recorded 18 months after the
training signals using a different receiver compared to the baseline test.
Liu and Doherty showed that IEEE 802.11a/g devices can be distinguished by
observing the spectral regrowth, a distortion caused by nonlinear power amplifiers
[30]. By modeling the power amplifiers as memoryless nonlinear systems and using
the learned complex power series coefficients for each device as a feature vector, they
were able to show that three devices operating at a fixed power level are separable
in two dimensions. Furthermore, they demonstrated that changing the power level
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of each device moves the feature vector along a predictable trajectory, allowing the
devices to be distinguished in three dimensions for variable power levels.
Carroll showed that embedding a recorded signal in a higher dimension using
a time-delay embedding technique allows for the classification of wireless devices by
device-specific linear and nonlinear behavior, which may be different across devices
even of the same model due to manufacturing variability [31,32]. Classification of the
embedded signal requires direct comparison with an embedded signal with known
transmitter assignment. Unfortunately, when using a large training set, this requires
a prohibitively large number of direct comparisons to classify a single signal. Yuan et
al. developed a technique based on the embedding signal that does not require such
direct comparisons [33]. Their method performs singular value decomposition (SVD)
on the matrix representing the signal embedding, as well as on matrices measuring
the angle and distance between neighboring points, and uses the singular values as
a feature vector. Their method then uses PCA for dimensionality reduction and a
SVM to classify signals from four IEEE 802.11b transmitters. They demonstrate
90%+ correct identification rates at 10 dB SNR and above.
Finally, Andrews et al. developed techniques for crowdsourcing measurements
for RF fingerprinting, including ways to combine high-level decisions, features, and
full signals recorded at the same time from several different receivers [34]. They
examine possible benefits to this sort of setup, including the possibility of sub-
Nyquist sampling at individual receivers and increased performance under certain
conditions.
15
2.2 RF Fingerprint Classifiers Based on Neural Network Models
Willson, as well as Shieh and Lin, used neural network models acting on hand-
crafted feature vectors to identify individual radar transmitters [35, 36]. However,
the network input parameters, such as pulse width and pulse repetition interval,
are specific to the radar domain and would not be relevant in a typical digital
communications setting.
Üreten and Serinken trained a probabilistic neural network (PNN) to distin-
guish eight IEEE 802.11b WiFi cards using the transient amplitude signal of the
transmissions, along with PCA for dimensionality reduction [37]. Similarly, Köse et
al. developed a technique where a PNN classifies eight IEEE 802.11b WiFi cards
by the energy spectrum coefficients from the transient turn-on signal [38]. These
techniques are noteworthy as they combine an expert knowledge of distinguishable
signal characteristics with a neural network which uses a data-driven approach to
learn the most relevant features for discrimination. Our approach is different in that
it learns features from the steady state portion of the transmission. This is useful as
the steady state portion is typically received at a higher average power level and has
a much longer duration than the transient. Consequently, their techniques required
a sampling rate of 5 GHz to sufficiently sample the transient, while our techniques
operate at a sample rate of 16 MHz. In addition, our methods utilize the complex
baseband signal, rather than just the amplitude signal, allowing our technique to
potentially learn additional features that are present in the signal phase, which may
be more relevant for the types of devices we study [16].
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More recently, a number of techniques for RF fingerprinting using neural net-
work structures for feature extraction and, in most cases, classification have been
published. However, most of these techniques operate exclusively on preamble or
control information rather than randomly generated data payloads, and do not uti-
lize a careful pre-processing sequence as is presented in this dissertation to limit
the ability of the network to learn unreliable features, or those which can easily be
spoofed.
Jafari et al. evaluated multilayer perceptron (MLP), CNN, and LSTM net-
works for classifying baseband signals from six ZigBee devices, finding that MLP
and CNN structures greatly surpass the performance of the LSTM network [39].
Contrarily, Wu et al. trained a LSTM network to distinguish six universal software
radio peripherals (USRPs) from their baseband signals with high performance down
to -12 dB SNR [40]. Riyaz et al. demonstrated that a CNN architecture based
on AlexNet [11] and operating on baseband signals outperforms SVM and logis-
tic regression classifiers which use hand-crafted feature vectors [41]. In contrast to
these simpler approaches, several authors have introduced additional techniques in
an effort to enhance the ability to discern transmitters. Jiabao et al. showed that
presenting the signals to a CNN architecture at multiple sample rates simultaneously
can provide a slight boost to identification accuracy [42]. Additionally, Youssef et
al. showed that sequentially training a series of MLPs and stacking them in a hier-
archical structure, a process termed “multi-stage training,” can boost performance
over SVM, CNN, and single-MLP approaches on a set of 12 transmitters [43].
Several authors have transformed the time-domain signal into a 2D image, an
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input format where neural networks have been extensively studied. Baldini et al.
utilized a CNN structure operating on images produced using recurrence plots, a
visual representation of the phase space trajectory of the signal [44]. They report
increased identification accuracy compared to a 1D time-domain signal input at
higher SNR, but worse performance at lower SNR. Pan et al. demonstrated that
power amplifier nonlinearity specifically could be used as an identifying feature
by differentiating five simulated transmitters with different polynomial amplifier
nonlinearity characteristics [45]. Their approach used grayscale images produced by
the HHT as input to a ResNet architecture for feature extraction and classification.
Contrary to most other approaches, which use strictly real-valued weights,
Gopalakrishnan et al. investigated CNN approaches using complex-valued neural
networks by separately computing derivatives for the real and imaginary parts of
each weight during backpropagation and considering two different complex acti-
vation functions [46]. In doing so, they demonstrated successful RF fingerprint
identification on sets of 100 WiFi devices and 100 automatic dependent surveillance-
broadcast (ADS-B) devices, a technology used for tracking aircraft. Operating also
on aircraft signals, Chen et al. presented a network architecture based on ResNets
and Inception modules [47] to separately identify transmitters that implement ADS-
B and aircraft communications addressing and reporting system (ACARS) proto-
cols [48]. Their technique was evaluated on 5,157 and 3,143 classes and sample sizes
of 13,000,000 and 900,000 transmissions, respectively, and achieves 96.3% accuracy
for ADS-B and 98.1% accuracy for ACARS, demonstrating both the degree of vari-
ability between transmitters and the ability of a neural network model to distinguish
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individual transmitters in such a large population.
Wong demonstrated a series of CNN-based techniques for the RF fingerprinting
problem [49]. The first technique uses a CNN model as a feature extractor to mea-
sure I/Q imbalance parameters of a recorded transmitter, then uses these parameters
as input to a Bayesian model to perform classification based on a learned decision
boundary. The second technique uses a CNN model as a feature extractor, then uses
the density-based spatial clustering of applications with noise (DBSCAN) algorithm
to perform classification. Our approach differs in several important ways, including
that our approach uses a neural network for both feature extraction and classifica-
tion. Additionally, our approach synchronizes all transmissions prior to presentation
to the neural network to prevent an intermediate adversary from fooling the clas-
sifier by performing a frequency shift with their own device, as we demonstrate
in Chapter 5. Finally, their experiments demonstrate the technique using identical
transmissions from all radios, while the work presented here assumes unique random
bit sequences are encoded in all transmissions.
Hanna and Cabric developed a technique to simulate realistic nonlinear power
amplifiers from experimental measurements of real devices and demonstrated both
CNN and MLP networks to identify which simulated transmitter within a population
of 500 produced a given transmission [50]. Furthermore, they evaluated the impact
that the input representation of discrete Fourier transform (DFT) coefficients has
on discriminability and determined that the magnitude-only representation achieves
higher performance than either cartesian or polar coordinates. Chatterjee et al. sim-
ilarly evaluated performance using simulated transmitters, and estimated that they
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can reliably differentiate 10,000 unique devices using a hand-crafted feature vector of
device-specific features and channel information using a MLP for classification [51].
However, the performance of both techniques on real devices remains an open ques-
tion.
Restuccia et al. analyzed the problem of reusing a trained RF fingerprint
identification network when the channel changes between the transmitter and re-
ceiver [52]. To address a demonstrated performance drop-off after changes to the
channel, they adaptively learn a finite impulse response (FIR) filter at the receiver
which is fed back to the transmitter and used to adjust their signal prior to transmis-
sion. They demonstrated that in doing so, they can increase identification accuracy
while also reducing the effectiveness of an adversary which steals the filter coeffi-
cients. Morin et al. attempted to achieve channel-invariance through diversity of
their training data by recording from fixed devices with a robot moving randomly
throughout the room to continuously change the channel [53]. They demonstrated
improved generalization to a new channel, achieved by placing a metallic stool in
the room, compared to training in a completely static environment. We explore a
similar option in Chapter 5 where we simulate multipath environments and train on
a diverse set of individual channels to attempt to achieve invariance.
2.3 Other Applications of Neural Networks in the RF Domain
Benvenuto et al., as well as Mkadem and Boumaiza, demonstrated neural
network methods for digital predistortion of transmitted signals to compensate for
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RF power amplifier nonlinearity [54,55]. Additionally, Wray and Green proved that
a certain class of neural network models can equivalently represent a Volterra kernel
which is commonly used to model the nonlinear memory effects that are present in
RF power amplifiers [56]. Rather than compensating the distortions present in the
transmitted signals, RF fingerprinting algorithms seek to use them for classification.
Weng et al. used a simple MLP network to identify the presence or absence
of a receiver based on its unintended emissions [57]. They found that the oscillator
on-board each receiver tended to couple to the antenna, causing a weak signal to be
radiated. To detect this signal, they created a feature vector from cross-correlation
values between the measured signal and a reference signal in multiple frequency
bands, and used the MLP to classify the device presence or absence.
Wang et al. presented several successful techniques for performing indoor
localization using channel state information (CSI) from multiple antennas and sub-
carriers in an orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) network to cre-
ate feature vectors, and utilizing several neural network structures including au-
toencoders, restricted Boltzmann machines, and ResNets for feature extraction and
location estimation [58–60]. Zhang et al. similarly demonstrated a wireless lo-
calization technique which uses a stacked denoising autoencoder [61] to pretrain a
deep neural network for coarse localization, and a hidden Markov model (HMM)
for fine-grained localization [62]. In a similar manner, Huang et al. showed that a
deep neural network can be used to perform direction of arrival estimation as well as
channel estimation in massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems [63].
Mendis et al. developed a deep belief network-based modulation recognition
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algorithm operating on images produced using the spectral correlation function, a
measurement derived directly from the recorded signal [64]. Similarly, O’Shea et
al. demonstrated success in applying CNNs to the problem of blind modulation
classification [65]. Their method, which is based on ResNets, operates directly on
fixed-length complex baseband signals and learns to reliably identify the modulation
scheme used in the input signal in the presence of realistic channel effects such as
carrier phase/frequency offsets, Rayleigh channels, and noise. Later work has shown
that an adaptation of spatial transformer networks [66] can be used to perform blind
time, phase, and frequency synchronization on the signals in advance, increasing the
accuracy of the modulation recognition system [67].
Schmidt et al. used a CNN model for wireless interference identification for
IEEE 802.11, 802.15.4, and 802.15.1 devices in order to classify wireless devices
by wireless standard and allocated frequency channel [68]. Bitar et al. similarly
demonstrated the ability of a CNN model to identify transmissions by standard
using time-frequency measurements over the same set of protocols, including the
ability to correctly classify when devices of multiple standards were transmitting
simultaneously [69]. Kokalj-Filipovic et al. showed that pretraining using stacked
denoising autoencoders can reduce the size and increase the accuracy of a fully
connected network for protocol identification over a superset of the same protocols
[70].
Akeret et al. developed a CNN approach to radio frequency interference miti-
gation using a U-Net [71] architecture to identify and segment sources of man-made
radio interference from astronomical radio signals in time-frequency input data [72].
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Rutagemwa et al. demonstrated a generative model based on RNNs to generate sig-
nals with similar spectral usage statistics to a real environment, and used this model
to enhance spectrum assignment and sharing approaches for land mobile radios [73].
Recently, a handful of results for adversarial machine learning techniques in
the RF domain have been published. Sadeghi et al. developed both white box and
black box attacks on a deep learning-based modulation classification algorithm and
showed that they can successfully force an incorrect classifier decision with high
probability, even, in the case of the white box attack, when the perturbation is
several orders of magnitude lower in power than the noise [74]. Kokalj-Filipovic et
al. have published a number of works in this domain [75–77]. They demonstrated
a successful attack on both modulation and protocol recognition neural networks
using a surrogate model of the classifier on the attack side. Furthermore, they show
that pretraining convolutional weights in a CNN classifier with an autoencoder can
effectively defend against this sort of attack by essentially filtering out adversarial
perturbations since they are not useful for reconstruction. Finally, they show that
Kolmogorow-Smirnov tests on either the distribution of peak-to-average power ratio
measurements or softmax output layer probability distributions can detect statistical
differences between real and adversarial examples for these sorts of attacks against
classifiers in the RF domain.
GAN techniques in particular have found several recent uses within the RF
domain. Davaslioglu and Sagduyu developed a conditional GAN technique to de-
velop additional training data for random forest and SVM classifiers for spectrum
sensing [78]. Additionally, they developed a technique based on bidirectional GANs
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for performing domain adaptation when the channel environment changes. Tang et
al. used GANs to increase the quality of training data for a modulation classification
algorithm in order to increase the robustness of their classifier [79]. O’Shea et al.
developed a GAN model to approximate the response of a communication channel
and used this model to find an optimal physical layer encoding scheme for that
learned channel [80]. Likewise, Ye et al. developed a GAN model to represent chan-
nel impairments, then used this model to help train an end-to-end communication
system where the transmitter may utilize CSI to optimize their transmissions [81].
24
Chapter 3: Background
This chapter provides a brief introduction to devices that support the IEEE
802.15.4 standard, such as ZigBee devices, and also outlines the likely sources of
imperfection, and thus uniqueness, in the front-end of an example transmitter.
3.1 IEEE 802.15.4 and ZigBee
The IEEE 802.15.4 specification [1] defines the physical and MAC standards
used by a number of wireless protocols, including ZigBee. While some of the devices
used in our experiments implement the full ZigBee PRO stack, ZigBee is a higher
level protocol built on top of the physical layer specifications defined in the IEEE
802.15.4 standard [1,2]. The standard specifies a number of different physical layer
schemes; the scheme which we target specifies offset QPSK (O-QPSK) with half-sine
pulse shaping and direct-sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) modulation at a data
rate of 250 Kbps.
The half-sine pulse shaping used allows the data to be demodulated nonco-
herently using a binary frequency shift keying (FSK) demodulator. Because of the
DSSS technique used, 32 symbols are transmitted for every data byte. The first five
bytes of any IEEE 802.15.4 O-QPSK transmission include a four byte preamble of
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zeros, followed by the one byte start frame delimiter (SFD) 0xA7. These five bytes
collectively form the SHR field of the packet.
IEEE 802.15.4 compliant devices may operate in a number of different fre-
quency bands depending on the region, including 868, 915, and 2450 MHz bands.
The devices studied in this dissertation operate exclusively in the 2450 MHz indus-
trial, scientific, and medical (ISM) band and support 16 channels centered within
2405 MHz to 2480 MHz, each separated by 5 MHz. These devices must output
signals with an error vector magnitude (EVM) of less than 35% and must support
a transmit power level of at least -3 dBm.
3.2 Sources of Transmitter Variability
Variability in a number of different components causes measurable effects that
make it possible to perform RF fingerprinting. This section will outline the different
effects that may be present in transmitted signals and associate each effect with the
RF front-end components that cause them, using the direct-conversion transmitter
architecture shown in Figure 3.1 as an example. While a number of different trans-
mitter architectures are possible, no architecture is able to avoid all of the described
effects entirely.
Note that due to the tolerances in physical layer standards, such as the 35%
maximum EVM permitted in IEEE 802.15.4 devices, these effects can be present in
transmitted signals which still demodulate correctly and meet the spectral require-














Figure 3.1: A diagram showing the components in the front-end of a direct-
conversion transmitter.
decisions made by designers of different device models, such as the specific low-pass
filters to apply to the I and Q channels. However, variability can also be seen in
devices of the same model and is a result of unintentional differences that occur
during the manufacturing process.
3.2.1 Power Amplifier Nonlinearity
An ideal power amplifier has a constant, frequency-independent gain such
that the output signal is simply the input signal at a higher power level. This
behavior is deemed linear because a plot of the input power level versus output
power level is simply a straight line where the slope corresponds to the linear gain. In
practice, power amplifiers are nonlinear devices that behave approximately linearly
below some threshold of input power, and nonlinear beyond that threshold as the
amplifier approaches saturation. An example of this behavior is shown in Figure 3.2
and demonstrates the input/output relation for both an ideal linear amplifier and a
nonlinear amplifier.
The effect of a nonlinear power amplifier on a signal may be illustrated by









Power Amplifier Input/Output Relation
Linear Amplifier
Nonlinear Amplifier
Figure 3.2: An example input/output relation for a nonlinear power amplifier. At
lower input power levels, the output power is a scalar multiple of the input power.
Once the input power passes a certain threshold, the amplifier begins to operate in
the nonlinear region and eventually saturates.
causes an effect known as intermodulation which induces additional tones in the
output spectrum that were not present in the input. These tones are at predictable
locations given by sums of integer multiples of the input frequencies. An example
of this effect is shown in Figure 3.3 where Figure 3.3(a) represents a linear amplifier
and simply shows the three tones that were present at the input, and Figure 3.3(b)
represents a nonlinear amplifier where a number of additional tones are present.
Harmonic distortion may be visualized by passing a single tone through the ampli-
fier, causing additional tones at integer multiples of the input frequency.
Constant envelope modulation schemes, such as the O-QPSK with half-sine
pulse shaping modulation employed by IEEE 802.15.4, are more robust to nonlinear
amplifiers because they operate at a fixed point on the input/output curve [83].
However, other sources of distortion in the RF front-end, such as I/Q imbalance,
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Frequency Spectrum of Linear Amplifier
(a) Linear Amplifier Frequency Spectrum














Frequency Spectrum of Nonlinear Amplifier
(b) Nonlinear Amplifier Frequency Spectrum
Figure 3.3: The frequency spectrum for a set of three tones through a simulated
(a) linear amplifier and (b) nonlinear amplifier. The nonlinear amplifier produces
intermodulation as evidenced by the additional tones present in its spectrum.
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may cause the envelope to be non-constant prior to the power amplifier. Since
communication signals are typically present over a much larger number of frequencies
than the sum of three tones, the effect on the spectrum is less straightforward than
additional induced tones.
Power amplifier nonlinearity is often modeled using a subset of the causal















x∗(t−τn)dτ1 . . . dτ2k+1,
(3.1)
where y(t) is the model output, x(t) is the complex baseband signal, and coefficients
h2k+1(τ1, . . . , τ2k+1) characterize linear and nonlinear behavior of the particular sys-
tem. In practice, this series must be truncated, requiring the order, 2k + 1, to be
limited to a finite maximum value and delay terms τi to be limited, ∀i, so that
the system has finite memory. Since even finite-order, finite-memory Volterra mod-
els are computationally expensive, subsets such as memory polynomials [86] and
generalized memory polynomials [87] may be used.
3.2.2 I/Q Imbalance
I/Q imbalance comprises two issues: gain imbalance and quadrature skew.
Gain imbalance occurs as a result of mismatch in the components in the I and
Q paths, whether in the digital-to-analog converters (DACs), low-pass filters, or
mixers, and causes unequal gain along these two paths. Quadrature skew occurs
when the carrier signals input to the mixers are not exactly 90◦ out of phase [88].
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The combined effects of these two issues may be seen in Figure 3.4, where a 16-
symbol quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) constellation is used to highlight
the impact. Gain imbalance causes the constellation to be stretched or squeezed
along the I and Q dimensions, and quadrature skew causes a loss of orthogonality
between I and Q channels.















Ideal Constellation I/Q Imbalance Constellation
Figure 3.4: The effect of I/Q imbalance on the constellation diagram of a 16QAM
modulation scheme.
Define x(t) = i(t) + jq(t) as the ideal baseband signal at time t. Then, the
ideal output of the adder after mixing is given by
y(t) = i(t)cos(2πft)− q(t)sin(2πft), (3.2)
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where f is the center frequency at which the signal is transmitted.
Let α denote excess gain along the I path, β denote excess gain along the Q
path, and φ denote quadrature skew which we model as phase error in the Q path.
Then, the output of the adder is
y(t) = (1 + α)i(t)cos(2πft)− (1 + β)q(t)sin(2πft+ φ). (3.3)
Using the following trigonometric identity,
sin(θ1 + θ2) = sin(θ1)cos(θ2) + cos(θ1)sin(θ2), (3.4)
this becomes















where the loss of orthogonality between I and Q channels is now apparent. From
inspection, it can then be seen that this is equivalent to a transmitter where the
32
baseband signal is given by ximb(t) = iimb(t) + jqimb(t), where
iimb(t) = (1 + α)i(t)− (1 + β)q(t)sin(φ),
qimb(t) = (1 + β)q(t)cos(φ).
(3.7)
3.2.3 Phase and Frequency Error
In practice, the local oscillators (LOs) used for mixing at the transmitter and
receiver are not perfectly synchronized, resulting in phase and frequency offsets
between the two devices. In addition, oscillators exhibit a time-varying additive
random noise to their phase known as phase noise. As a result, the LO for the
transmit side produces a signal given by
cos(2π(f + δT )t+ φT + θT (t)), (3.8)
and the LO for the receiver produces a signal given by
cos(2π(f + δR)t+ φR + θR(t)), (3.9)
where δT and δR represent frequency offsets, φT and φR represent fixed phase offsets,




The architecture given in Figure 3.1 includes linear filters: low-pass filters on
both the I and Q paths, and a band-pass filter immediately prior to transmission. As
all three of these filters are implemented in the analog domain, they are all suscep-
tible to manufacturing differences due to non-zero tolerance in the components they
are made from, such as resistors, capacitors, inductors, and transistors. Moreover,
the specific filter design is often a decision that is left to the manufacturer, provided
that specific power spectral density requirements are met. These filters may each
be modeled as a causal linear time-invariant (LTI) system for which the output is






where y(t) is the filter output, x(t) is the filter input, and h(t) is the impulse response
of the filter.
3.2.5 I/Q Origin Offset
If there if any direct current (DC) offset present at the output of the DACs,
this offset will be presented as a tone at the center frequency after mixing. After
downconversion at the receiver, this tone will be shifted to 0 Hz and cause the center
of the constellation diagram to shift from the origin, resulting in symbols that are
likewise shifted from their ideal locations, as shown in Figure 3.5. This may also
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be caused by mismatch between the mixers in the I and Q paths resulting in LO
leakage to the transmitted signal [88]. The I/Q origin offset may be modeled as
simple shifts in i(t) and q(t) from their ideal values, or
y(t) = (i(t) + ∆i) + j(q(t) + ∆q), (3.11)
where ∆i and ∆q represent the offset in the I and Q directions, respectively [89].













Ideal Constellation Shifted Constellation
Figure 3.5: The effect of I/Q origin offset on the constellation diagram of the trans-
mitted QPSK symbols. The symbols, which lie on a circle to denote constant am-
plitude, are shifted in both the I and Q directions.
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3.2.6 Digital-to-Analog Converter Nonlinearity
DACs map a finite number of digital codes to corresponding output voltages.





where Vout represents the output voltage, dinput represents the signed decimal number
associated with the input code, and G is a constant scale factor. The output of a
linear DAC, therefore, changes by a fixed voltage when the input changes to an
adjacent code. However, a nonlinear DAC does not obey this simple relationship
and can be evaluated by its differential nonlinearity (DNL) and integral nonlinearity
(INL).
Differential nonlinearity measures the deviation of the actual change in volt-
age between adjacent input codes from the ideal value, and will vary depending on
which input codes are evaluated for a nonlinear DAC. Integral nonlinearity measures
the deviation of analog output levels from the ideal level, and also is dependent on
which input code is evaluated [90]. An example of input/output relations for both
linear and nonlinear DACs is shown in Figure 3.6. Similarly to power amplifier
nonlinearity, DAC nonlinearity introduces harmonic distortion and intermodulation






















































Figure 3.6: Example input/output relations for linear and nonlinear 4-bit signed
DACs. Note that the input codes are represented in two’s complement form.
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Chapter 4: Convolutional Neural Networks for Identification and
Verification of RF Fingerprints from Error Signals
4.1 Introduction
First, we present an RF fingerprinting technique which employs a CNN archi-
tecture to classify windowed sections of recorded complex baseband signals by trans-
mitting device. We develop a careful pre-processing sequence to prepare recorded
signals for presentation to the network and focus on removing sources of potential
bias or trivial classification to improve classifier robustness. We then present our
CNN architectures, which are structured similarly to networks typically used in the
computer vision domain. Then, we show that combining network predictions across
multiple windows enables classification of each full transmission, and further demon-
strate that the classification performance on each full transmission is significantly
higher than the single window performance. This section presents classifiers for both
the verification and identification problems, and demonstrates the performance on
data recorded both in a laboratory environment and an urban outdoor environment




We demonstrate our technique on a collection of seven Digi XBP24CZ7SITB003
ZigBee Pro devices operating in the 2.4 GHz band. The device under test (DUT)
was added to a network with another device, known as the coordinator in the Zig-
Bee protocol, to allow transmission. A unique set of packets with random 32 byte
payloads was generated in MATLAB for each device and sent to the DUT using
the Digi XCTU software [93]. All devices transmitted on IEEE 802.15.4 channel 11,
corresponding to a 2.405 GHz center frequency, and were configured to transmit at
their maximum power level of 18 dBm. For each device, approximately 28 seconds
of data was digitized at a sampling rate of 16 MHz, and the received signal was
downconverted to baseband and recorded on a Rohde & Schwarz FSW67 signal and
spectrum analyzer with external SRS FS725 reference.
We demonstrate our technique via two experiments: In one experiment, a
CNN is trained on data collected outdoors through a noisy channel. In a second
experiment, a CNN is trained on data collected in a lab environment with simulated
additive white Gaussian noise. For the outdoor experiment, both the coordinator
and the DUT were connected to Pulse Electronics W1030 omni-directional anten-
nas and DUTs were located approximately 30 meters from the receive antenna in an
urban outdoor environment where the estimated in-band SNR of the received trans-
missions is approximately 28 dB. For the lab experiment, DUTs were hardwired to
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a power splitter which was connected directly to the signal and spectrum analyzer,
and the transmissions are assumed to be virtually noise-free.
4.2.2 Data Pre-processing
Prior to training the network, a number of pre-processing steps are taken in
MATLAB. First, each individual transmission is extracted from the recording. Next,
the estimated ideal signal is used to synchronize the transmissions in phase, fre-
quency, and time. Because the signals are oversampled, each signal is then low-pass
filtered to remove components that fall outside the transmitter passband. Finally,
the error signal for each transmission is calculated and saved to its own file. The
error signal for each transmission is used as an input to the CNN.
4.2.2.1 Extraction
Approximate start and stop times for each transmission were detected in MAT-
LAB by thresholding the amplitude differences between adjacent samples. Each
transmission was aligned to a reference signal containing the five byte SHR by
cross-correlating the instantaneous frequency of the received and reference signals.
The final alignment selected the time lag between signals that maximized the cross-
correlation and produced a valid checksum of the demodulated data. Transmissions
from the coordinator were discarded, and to demonstrate that the method is un-
affected by the data contents of the transmission, only the portion of the signal
containing the 32 byte random payload and the two byte checksum from each trans-
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mission was retained. Each remaining signal was scaled by dividing all samples
by the root mean square (RMS) of the magnitude signal so that slight power level
differences between transmitters did not permit trivial classification. Each of the
first 1,000 valid transmissions from each device for each experiment was processed
in this manner and saved to its own MATLAB file.
4.2.2.2 Additive Noise
For the lab data experiment, each transmission was included in the dataset sev-
eral times with varying levels of simulated additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN).
After extraction, additive noise was imposed on each transmission via MATLAB’s
awgn() function. Each transmission was included in the dataset eight times for each
SNR in the range {10, 15, 20, . . . , 40} dB. Each instance of the same transmission at
a particular SNR uses a different random noise signal. By including each transmis-
sion several times, we are able to increase the amount of training data given a fixed
amount of lab data. The network was trained on the entire training dataset at once
rather than training at a single SNR.
4.2.2.3 Synchronization
A common problem in demodulation of wireless transmissions is that of syn-
chronization between the transmitter and receiver. In this case, the signals may
be demodulated noncoherently. However, because we are using the baseband er-
ror signal, we perform synchronization on each transmission individually to remove
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fixed frequency and phase offsets from the signal and improve the sample timing
between the transmitter and receiver. In doing so, we aim to remove trivial features
that fluctuate randomly or are easily spoofed, and learn more reliable features for
classification. Further, this reduces sources of bias in the experiment since the phase
relationship between the transmitter and receiver oscillators could change by simply
resetting either device.
Since the transmissions can be demodulated noncoherently and we are target-
ing a known modulation scheme, we assume that the ideal discrete-time baseband
signal can be estimated based on the demodulated symbols. We model the synchro-
nization error between the transmitter and receiver as a fixed frequency and phase
offset which are constant for the entirety of a single transmission, but which may
be different for each transmission. For simplicity, we model these as offsets in the
transmitter from the receiver’s ideal values. That is, for complex baseband signal
xideal(t), time index t, and assuming no other channel distortion, the ideal passband
signal is given by
yideal(t) = Real(xideal(t)e
jωct), (4.1)
where ωc is the ideal carrier frequency. Due to the presence of the phase and




where ωo and θo are the transmitter’s frequency and phase offset, respectively. After
downconversion to baseband at the receiver, the received signal is
xmeas(t) = xideal(t)e
j(ωot+θo). (4.3)
To perform carrier synchronization, our goal is to find frequency correction ωf
and phase correction θf such that
xmeas(t)e
j(ωf t+θf ) ≈ xideal(t). (4.4)
If we model xideal(t) as an arbitrary time-dependent signal in the complex domain,
such that xideal(t) = A(t)e
jθ(t), then this becomes
A(t)ej(θ(t)+ωot+θo+ωf t+θf ) ≈ A(t)ej(θ(t)). (4.5)
If we define ∠xideal(t) and ∠xmeas(t) to be the phase angle of the ideal and measured
baseband signals, respectively, then the following two expressions are equivalent
− ωf t− θf ≈ (θ(t) + ωot+ θo)− θ(t), (4.6)
ωf t+ θf ≈ unwrap(∠xideal(t)− ∠xmeas(t)). (4.7)










Synchronization is typically performed with phase-locked loops to recover the carrier
prior to demodulation. In this case, since the signal may be demodulated noncoher-
ently and the estimated ideal signal may be generated, linear regression is used to
find optimal values of ωf and θf and to perform the frequency and phase corrections
for each transmission.
Finally, the sample timing of each transmission is synchronized to the esti-
mated ideal signal. To start, the estimated ideal signal is generated at a sample
rate of 160 MHz and the received signal is interpolated by a factor of ten. The
two signals are aligned by maximizing the cross-correlation over possible lag values
in the range [−9, 9]. Rather than shifting the estimated ideal signal, the received
signal is always shifted and, if necessary for alignment, the first ten samples of the
estimated ideal signal are removed. Both signals are then downsampled by a factor
of ten to restore the original 16 MHz sample frequency. By only shifting the received
signal, the sample timing of the estimated ideal signal is unchanged and at most
one sample is lost.
4.2.2.4 Error Signal Generation
Each signal was forward-backward filtered through a fourth order Butterworth
filter with a 2 MHz passband. The ideal signal was subtracted from each transmis-
sion resulting in the error signal for that transmission.
Any device-dependent features that may be useful for classification will not
be present in the ideal signal. By subtracting the estimated ideal signal from the
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recorded transmissions to generate the error signal, we allow the network to ignore
the portion of the signal that would be common across devices and focus on the
differences which may be caused by features specific to each device, such as those
outlined in Chapter 3.
4.2.2.5 Dataset Generation
Each signal was split into N non-overlapping segments of M consecutive sam-
ples. The network was trained on and learned to classify these segments of M
samples, and the output of the network on each segment was combined later to clas-
sify each overall transmission. This splitting technique is useful for multiple reasons.
For one, reducing the length of the network input signal decreases the size of the
network, allowing for faster training and likely requiring less training data than a
larger network. In addition, by splitting the signal into many smaller components,
the method can be adapted for use with signals of arbitrary lengths by simply ad-
justing the threshold for classification by the number of M -sample segments in the
signal.
The complex data from the time-series error signal was split into real and
imaginary parts and treated as two separate input channels. Each time-series signal
was normalized by subtracting off the mean value and dividing by the standard
deviation, computed separately on both the real and imaginary parts for a given
transmission. One dataset was created for the outdoor experiment, and a second
for the indoor experiment. Each full dataset of 7,000 transmissions was randomly
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Layer Dimension Parameters Activation
Input 1,024x2 - -
Convolution 1D 128x19 4,992 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Convolution 1D 32x15 61,472 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Convolution 1D 16x11 5,648 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Flatten - - -
Dense 128 239,744 ELU
Dropout (0.5) - - -
Dense 16 2,064 ELU
Dropout (0.5) - - -
Dense 7 119 Softmax
Table 4.1: The layers of the identification network for the outdoor data, along with
the number of parameters and activation function of each layer.
partitioned into 80% training data, 10% validation data, and 10% testing data with
all N segments of a given transmission belonging to the same set. The same set
assignment was used for both the identification and verification problems for a given
dataset. The order of the segments was randomly shuffled for the training dataset,
and then the resulting datasets were saved in HDF5 format.
4.2.3 Convolutional Neural Network
A deep CNN was used to solve the identification and verification problems,
with the network structures given in Tables 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3. The exponential
linear unit (ELU) [94] was selected as the activation function for all applicable
layers except the output layer where Softmax was used. The identification networks
for the outdoor experiment and lab experiment have a total of 314,039 and 1,074,727
trainable parameters, respectively. The verification networks for both experiments
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Layer Dimension Parameters Activation
Input 1,024x2 - -
Convolution 1D 128x19 4,992 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Convolution 1D 32x15 61,472 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Flatten - - -
Dense 128 999,552 ELU
Dropout (0.5) - - -
Dense 64 8,256 ELU
Dropout (0.5) - - -
Dense 7 455 Softmax
Table 4.2: The layers of the identification network for the lab data with artificial
noise, along with the number of parameters and activation function of each layer.
Layer Dimension Parameters Activation
Input 1,024x2 - -
Convolution 1D 32x19 1,248 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Convolution 1D 128x19 77,952 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Convolution 1D 32x15 61,472 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Convolution 1D 16x11 5,648 ELU
Max Pooling 2 - -
Flatten - - -
Dense 128 106,624 ELU
Dropout (0.5) - - -
Dense 16 2,064 ELU
Dropout (0.5) - - -
Dense 2 34 Softmax
Table 4.3: The layers of the verification networks, along with the number of param-
eters and activation function of each layer.
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have a total of 255,042 trainable parameters. Categorical cross-entropy was used to
compute the loss.
For these experiments, there are K = 7 devices, N = 17 segments per trans-
mission, and M = 1, 024 samples per segment. Values for N and M were determined
experimentally. Intuitively, M = 1, 024 corresponds to segments of length two bytes.
As demonstrated in our results, this choice of segment length is long enough to de-
tect repetitive patterns in the transmissions. However, this choice of M is also short
enough to permit a relatively small input layer, and thus a CNN of a manageable
size. Finally, M corresponding to a two byte segment allows for the scalability of
the method to any signal with a length that is a multiple of two bytes. Therefore, at
most one byte from an arbitrary transmission would be discarded for classification
purposes.
For identification, a network was trained on all seven devices, with each device
representing a class. For verification, the network was trained on all seven devices,
with one device selected as the positive class for each model and the remaining
devices all considered as a single negative class.
4.2.3.1 Classification
For the identification problem with K devices, the network output is a length-
K vector interpreted as the set of estimated probabilities that the selected M -sample
error signal belongs to each of the K devices. For verification, the network output
is a vector of length two, representing the estimated probability distribution of the
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event that the signal matches the device associated with the positive class for that
network.
To assign a class label to the overall transmission x, we treat each of the M -
sample vectors xi for i = 1, . . . , N as mutually independent. Of course, this assump-
tion is overly simplistic, as all M -sample vectors belong to the same transmission.
Still, it provides a simple way to combine the estimated probability distributions
of the different segments into a single metric and also provides strong classifica-
tion performance. With this assumption, and denoting the estimated probability
that segment xi belongs to class ωk as p(ωk;xi), the estimated probability that all
segments xi, i = 1, . . . , N belong to class ωk is given by




Since it is known a priori that all xi for i = 1, . . . , N come from the same transmis-
sion x, and thus belong to the same class, the estimated probability p(ωk;x) that
transmission x belongs to class ωk is given by
p(ωk;x) =
p(ωk;x1, . . . , xN)∑K
r=1 p(ωr;x1, . . . , xN)
. (4.10)
Transmission x may then be assigned to the class with the highest estimated prob-
ability. Because of numerical precision concerns when a large number of segments
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For the identification problem, the proportion of samples in each class was
approximately 1/7, with some variation due to the randomness of the split. Since
verification is a one-vs-all problem, approximately 1/7 of the available data belonged
to the positive class, and 6/7 of the data belonged to the negative class for each
verification problem. During identification, all classes were given uniform weight.
During verification, the positive class was given a weight of six and the negative
class was given a weight of one due to the class imbalance.
Glorot uniform initialization [95] was used for kernel initialization of all con-
volutional and dense layers, and all bias vectors were initialized to the zero vector.
The Adam optimizer and its original parameters was used for training [96]. The
batch size was set to 1,024 segments and the order of the batches was shuffled prior
to each epoch.
During training, only the classification performance of each 1,024-sample seg-
ment is considered. Each overall transmission is not classified during the training
phase as the loss is computed for the segments only.
Validation was performed after every epoch. For the identification problem, a
classification of each transmission in the validation set is performed during valida-
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tion using Equation 4.11 as the confidence metric for each class. The classification
accuracy on the validation set was tracked, and training was terminated when the ac-
curacy did not improve for R consecutive evaluations on the validation set, at which
point the best performing model was saved and used for testing. For the outdoor
identification problem R = 20, and for the outdoor verification problem R = 10.
For the identification problem with lab data R = 10, and the verification problem
with lab data had a value of R = 5. For verification, each transmission is assigned
to either the positive or negative class, and the ROC was calculated by thresholding
the values calculated using Equation 4.11. The area under the curve (AUC) was
calculated for the ROC, and the model with the highest AUC was tracked. Training
was terminated when the AUC did not improve for R consecutive passes through
the validation set, and the best performing model was saved.
4.2.3.3 Testing
During testing, the remaining 10% of transmissions were split into segments of
1,024 samples and given a forward pass through the network and the metric given in
Equation 4.11 was calculated for each transmission. For identification, these values
were compared, and the device with the maximum value was assigned as the class
label. For verification, these values were thresholded to produce ROC and P-R











1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 85 2 1 0 0 0 1
2 0 93 2 0 0 0 9
3 1 8 92 0 0 0 0
4 0 3 0 103 0 0 0
5 0 0 2 0 86 14 2
6 1 0 0 0 3 87 0
7 0 0 0 5 0 0 100
Table 4.4: The confusion matrix for the seven device identification problem for the
outdoor data indicating the number of transmissions in each class of the test set
and their classification.
4.2.3.4 Implementation
A NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti GPU was used to train and test the net-
work. All data pre-processing was done in MATLAB R2017a and the CNN was
implemented in Python using Keras 2.0.9 [97] with TensorFlow 1.3.0 [98] as the
backend.
4.3 Results and Discussion
Results from the outdoor and lab experiments are given in Figures 4.1-4.2 and
Tables 4.4 - 4.8 . For both experiments, overfitting was observed during the late
stages of training. This is evident because early on, the classification accuracy of
the CNN on the training set approximately matched that of the validation set, while
near the end of training the validation accuracy peaked, and the training accuracy
continued to improve. For this reason, we track the model with the best performance
on the validation set, and end training after the validation performance metrics stop
improving as defined in Section 4.2.3.
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Figure 4.1: Receiver operating characteristic curves for each of the seven verification
problems for the outdoor data. The AUC is included in the legend for each device.




















Figure 4.2: Precision-recall curves for each for the seven verification problems for
the outdoor data, with the AUC for each curve given in the legend.
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Network Epochs Training Time (minutes)
Identification 65 24.29
Verification 1 41 12.87
Verification 2 29 9.89
Verification 3 45 14.06
Verification 4 28 9.60
Verification 5 55 16.36
Verification 6 14 6.10
Verification 7 65 19.25
Table 4.5: The number of epochs until the best model was found and the total
training time for each network for the outdoor data. (Note that training continued
after the best model was obtained and this is included in the total training time.)
Network Epochs Training Time (minutes)
Identification 17 482.14
Verification 1 1 87.68
Verification 2 3 114.03
Verification 3 1 87.30
Verification 4 3 118.82
Verification 5 2 100.19
Verification 6 1 89.52
Verification 7 1 87.89
Table 4.6: The number of epochs until the best model was found and the total
training time for each network for the lab data. (Note that training continued after
the best model was obtained and this is included in the total training time.)








Table 4.7: The overall accuracy at each SNR for the lab experiment identification
problem.












A confusion matrix for the identification problem is shown in Table 4.4. The
overall correct identification rate is 92.29% and the correct classification rate over all
1,024 sample segments in the test set is 77.01%. This demonstrates that the metric
given in Equation 4.11 combines the results of the 1,024-sample segments in a way
that boosts the classification performance over that of a single segment. Results
for the verification problem are given in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The mean ROC AUC
of all devices is 0.9852 indicating very strong verification performance. Additional
information regarding the amount of training for each network is given in Table 4.5.
4.3.2 Lab Experiment
Table 4.6 describes the number of epochs of training until the best network
parameters were found, as measured by the performance on the validation set, as
well as the total training time in minutes for each network. It is important to note
that since the network and training dataset in the lab experiment were larger, the
total training time increases even though the network is able to converge in fewer
epochs. Table 4.7 displays the overall accuracy on the test set at each SNR for the
identification problem. As expected, the network performs better on higher SNR
transmissions, with significant performance drop-off below 20 dB. Table 4.8 shows
the average over all devices of the ROC AUC and average P-R AUC at different
SNRs for the verification networks.
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4.4 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that CNN techniques which provide state-of-the-art
performance in image and speech recognition problems can be applied to the problem
of RF fingerprinting. Our method relies on steady state analysis of the signal and
achieves high identification and verification accuracy on seven ZigBee devices. Our
method also permits use of the full transmission for fingerprinting regardless of
the data content of the signal, rather than relying only on preambles or otherwise
common bit sequences.
Furthermore, we have demonstrated that deep learning methods are suitable
for RF fingerprinting of the types of devices used in IoT networks because of their
ability to adapt to and discover the features available in the target signals that are
useful for classification. In contrast, approaches based on models or features that
are defined a priori may have difficulty detecting sufficient differences to distinguish
the devices if those particular features are not the most prominent in the selected
class of devices.
It is significant to note that the network used for lab data with multiple SNRs
requires more parameters than the one used for outdoor data at effectively a fixed
SNR. This demonstrates that increasing the size of the network and providing ad-
ditional training data allows the network to learn additional channel effects while
maintaining high performance. This shows promise for the ability of our technique
to adapt to data collected under varying conditions, such as power levels and center
frequencies, by training on a more diverse dataset and using a larger network.
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Chapter 5: Enhancing RF Fingerprint Verification with Recurrent
Neural Networks
5.1 Introduction
The methods presented in Chapter 4 provided promise that neural network
techniques for RF fingerprinting are possible. In this chapter, we build upon the
techniques provided in Chapter 4 and perform several experiments which evaluate
the usefulness of such methods in real-world environments. First, we enhance the
algorithm presented in Chapter 4 with an improved pre-processing sequence and the
addition of RNN components to improve performance, particularly at low SNRs.
Then, we measure the performance of our technique against devices that were not
seen during the training process to more closely model performance in a real-world
scenario. We evaluate this performance as a function of the total number of devices
seen during training to show that the generalizability of the classifier is improved as
the size of the population of known devices increases.
Next, we apply a simulated realistic multipath channel model and assess the
classifier performance both with and without a priori knowledge of the distribution
of multipath environments. Ren et al. have shown previously that the sort of tame
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indoor office environments where such IoT devices would typically operate cause
some degradation in fingerprint classification performance on a set of hand-crafted
features, but that the effect is relatively limited and varies significantly amongst the
different features, with transient features impacted most drastically [99]. Below, we
perform a similar experiment, except we use a neural network classifier model and
determine whether a priori knowledge of the distribution of multipath environments
helps to mitigate the performance degradation.
Additionally, we emphasize the importance of frequency synchronization through
a simple experiment that outlines the ease of fooling a classifier trained on unsyn-
chronized transmissions. Finally, we present a simple technique for reducing the




During the data collection process, 6,000 transmissions were recorded at a
sampling frequency of 16 MHz from each of 30 Digi XBP24CZ7SITB003 devices.
Each DUT was connected to a Pulse Electronics W1030 omni-directional antenna
inside a Ramsey Electronics STE3000B shielded RF test enclosure and configured as
a ZigBee router transmitting at the maximum power level of 18 dBm using the Digi
XCTU software [93]. Another identical antenna was placed inside the enclosure and













Figure 5.1: The data collection setup for the Digi devices.
one at a time with a separate device, the ZigBee coordinator, inside a separate
enclosure in an identical configuration. Both receive antennas were connected to a
power splitter, and the combined time-series signal was downconverted to baseband
and saved on a Rohde & Schwarz FSW67 signal and spectrum analyzer with external
reference oscillator. Each packet transmitted by the DUT was a 32 byte uniform
randomly generated bit sequence with a two byte checksum, and was generated on
a PC and transmitted to the DUT over USB. A diagram of this setup is shown in
Figure 5.1.
5.2.2 Data Pre-processing
The data pre-processing sequence is similar to the steps followed in Chapter
4.2.2 since it outlines a method to generate a dataset free from certain biases, e.g.
minor power differences or center frequency offsets amongst transmitters that could
serve as trivial, unreliable, and easy-to-spoof features. The primary pre-processing



















Figure 5.2: The sequence of pre-processing steps to prepare a transmission for clas-
sification by the neural network.
tipath environments, and the presentation of the entire signal to the network at
once, rather than presenting only short, fixed-size signal segments and manually
combining those estimates to create an overall prediction. In addition, a different
synchronization technique is used as it is more robust at lower SNRs than the previ-
ous technique, and a wider range of SNRs are evaluated. The full data pre-processing
chain is described below and summarized in Figure 5.2.
The first step is to detect and extract the packets transmitted by each DUT
within the raw signal recordings. Since the data collection was performed inside of
a sealed enclosure and has very high SNR, this is performed by simply thresholding
the amplitude of the recorded signal. To measure the performance of our method
in the presence of noisy multipath channels, each transmission is optionally passed
through a unique, randomly generated simulated multipath channel described in
Section 5.2.2.2, then combined with AWGN. Note that the simulated SNRs assume
that each measured signal is recorded completely noise-free.
Each signal is then synchronized in frequency, phase, and time using the tech-
nique described in Section 5.2.2.1.
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Because the data is recorded at 16 samples per symbol, we low-pass filter
the signal to a 2 MHz passband using a FIR filter of order 151 designed using the
Parks-McClellan algorithm [100]. In practice, this limits the ability of the neural
network to consider out-of-band emissions as features. Despite this limitation, in a
real-world setting, it is desirable to rely only on the in-band portion of the signal
since other devices may be transmitting on adjacent channels.
The signals are power-normalized, then the estimated ideal signal is sub-
tracted. The estimated ideal signal is produced simply be demodulating the re-
ceived waveform, then modulating the received symbols at the same sample rate.
The resulting signal is scaled by subtracting the mean of the signal and dividing by
the standard deviation, performed separately for real and imaginary components.
Finally, the signals are segmented by shaping them into a series of timesteps of 1,024
samples.
Within the neural network, the convolutional filters act separately on each
segment of the signal, then recurrent layers operate across segments to combine
information for the entire transmission. While a purely convolutional network does
not adapt as well to signals of varying lengths and presents computational issues
for extremely long signals, a purely recurrent network may have poor representation
ability due to having few input features per timestep, and may be inefficient due
to the large number of timesteps. Thus, we designed our network to utilize both
convolutional and recurrent components to combine the benefits of both approaches.
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5.2.2.1 Carrier Synchronization
We synchronize each individual transmission independently in phase, frequency,
and time to the receiver. We follow the data-aided Rife and Boorstyn algorithm us-
ing 218 FFT bins for coarse frequency synchronization outlined in [101]. Note that
the data-aided approach requires an estimate of the transmitted signal, for which
we use the estimated ideal signal that was already generated. We then perform fine
synchronization using Newton’s method as outlined in [102]. Finally, we perform
timing synchronization by interpolating the signal by a factor of ten, aligning it via
cross-correlation to the estimated ideal signal reproduced at ten times the sampling
frequency, then downsampling the result back to the original rate.
5.2.2.2 Multipath Simulation
The distribution of simulated multipath channels was designed to reflect typ-
ical indoor conditions in which IEEE 802.15.4 devices are most likely to operate.
Each time a transmission was added to a dataset for a given network at a particular
SNR, a different multipath channel was randomly generated and its effects were
imposed on the signal. In doing so, we aim to train the network to ignore the effects
of any one particular channel and attain a model which is useful over a range of
environments. Since each transmission at each SNR operates in a different channel,
we demonstrate the ability of our technique to learn the patterns present in the
signal itself, while ignoring channels effects whenever possible.
The number of path delays was selected from a uniform random distribution
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on the interval [1, 4], where one is equivalent to having a single transmission path
between transmitter and receiver, and four implies three additional paths along
which the signal is received. The distance d, in meters, between the transmitter
and the receiver was chosen randomly from a uniform distribution on the interval
[10, 100]. For each path, there is a corresponding time delay that represents the
amount of time in nanoseconds that the delayed signal arrives at the receiver after
the signal along the first path. Each delay was chosen from a uniform random





ns. This assumes that each path is
no more than d+ 30 when d ∈ [30, 100] m and no more than 2d when d ∈ [10, 30] m,
assuming the signal propagates at 300× 106 m/s. By convention, the first path has
a time delay of 0 ns. The gain in dB corresponding to each path delay n, is then
calculated by the following equation
gain(n) = −(K + 10m · log (d+ d′(n)) + σr),
where K = 53.7, m = 3.4, d′(n) is the difference between the distance that the path
of delay n traveled to the receiver and d, σ = 5.3, and r follows a standard normal
distribution [103]. This relationship between distance and gain is derived from a
set of experiments measuring IEEE 802.15.4 transmitters operating in the 2.4 GHz
band in indoor environments [103].
The generated path delays and path loss were then used as inputs to a Rayleigh
channel using MATLAB’s communications toolbox [104] which models the multi-
path channel as a linear FIR filter. Because the signals are narrowband relative
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to the delay spread of the channel, these channels are generally characterized as
frequency flat as they typically have no more than a few dB of frequency-selective
attenuation in the signal passband. While this may not significantly distort the
signal for demodulation purposes, it was previously unclear how much effect this
would have on RF fingerprinting since the differences between devices are already
so small.
5.2.2.3 Dataset Generation
For each instance of the verification network, we select a different device to
be the positive class, and place transmissions from the remaining devices in the
negative class. The datasets are split so that 4,800 transmissions from each device
are reserved for training, with another 600 reserved for each of the validation and
testing sets. When constructing the datasets, each transmission is included in a
given set for each of the following SNR levels in dB: {0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and
40}. Note that the SNRs are computed for the oversampled signal prior to filtering,
so the in-band SNRs are higher. For any given network, the classes are balanced so
that the total number of transmissions in the negative class sets is equal to those
of the corresponding positive class by randomly selecting a subset of transmissions
from the negative class.
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5.2.3 Neural Networks
We train verification networks to authenticate the identity of a single transmit-
ting device against a population of other identical devices. The proposed network
architecture is given in Table 5.1. The ELU activation function [94] was again used
for all convolution and dense layers except at the output layer where sigmoid was
used.
Layer Layer Description Parameters
Input 17× 1024× 2 -
Time-Distributed Convolution 1D 32× 19 1, 248
Time-Distributed Max Pooling Pool size = 2 -
Time-Distributed Convolution 1D 128× 19 77, 952
Time-Distributed Max Pooling Pool size = 2 -
Time-Distributed Convolution 1D 32× 15 61, 472
Time-Distributed Max Pooling Pool size = 2 -
Time-Distributed Convolution 1D 16× 11 5, 648
Time-Distributed Max Pooling Pool size = 2 -
Time-Distributed Flatten - -
Time-Distributed Dense 128 nodes 106, 624
Time-Distributed Dropout p = 0.5 -
Time-Distributed Dense 16 nodes 2, 064
Time-Distributed Dropout p = 0.5 -
LSTM 24 nodes 3, 936
Dense 1 node 25
Table 5.1: The network architecture and parameter count of each layer.
All experiments were performed using four NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1080 Ti
GPUs using Keras [97] with the Tensorflow backend [98]. The networks were trained
using the Adam optimizer [96] with default parameters, a batch size of 1,024 trans-
missions, and with binary cross-entropy as the loss function. For each experiment,
we first train an alternate network for each device for three epochs. The alternate
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network is obtained by removing the LSTM layer from the architecture given in
Table 5.1 and treating each signal segment as a unique training sample with its own
device label. Next, the LSTM layer is inserted and the the remaining weights are
initialized to the values from the trained alternate network.
The time-distributed layers in Table 5.1 indicate that the layer runs separately
on each signal segment. This is illustrated in Figure 5.3, with the architecture of a
CNN block given in Figure 5.4. The parameters in the CNN block are the same for
all segments in a given verification network. Training of the network continues for
up to 30 epochs, with early stopping if the area under the ROC curve evaluated on
the validation set does not increase for ten consecutive epochs. At that time, the

























































Figure 5.4: The architecture of a CNN block.
5.3 Experiments
This section provides an overview of each experiment performed using the
updated verification network architecture and training algorithm.
5.3.1 Baseline
To begin, we train 25 different verification networks on 25 devices, where for
each network there is a single device in the positive class, and the remaining 24
devices comprise the negative class. The baseline experiment simply evaluates each
of these trained networks on a testing set comprised of new transmissions from the
25 devices. These devices are referred to as known devices since their transmissions
are present in the training dataset. This experiment evaluates the ability of the
classifier to distinguish transmissions from transmitters that it has previously seen.
While less applicable to a realistic environment where devices from outside of the
training set are being used, this test serves to indicate how well the classifier is able
to learn the variability in a set of transmitters.
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5.3.2 Withheld Devices
A more challenging problem is for the algorithm performance to generalize
to devices that were not seen during training. Unfortunately, RF fingerprinting
methods have limited practical use if they cannot generalize to previously unknown
devices, since an unauthorized user is unlikely to use a known device to attempt to
gain unauthorized network access. For this experiment, we evaluate the previously
trained networks from the baseline experiment on withheld devices by replacing the
negative class data from the baseline test with transmissions from the five remain-
ing devices that have no transmissions included in the training sets. In addition,
we expand upon this experiment by repeating the baseline training and withheld
device evaluation procedure using a variable number of known devices in the neg-
ative class during training. This experiment tests the hypothesis that a negative
class constructed with a larger number of known devices will generalize better, as
evidenced by higher performance on the set of withheld devices.
5.3.3 Multipath Model
Next, we evaluate the impact that the simulated multipath model has on the
ability of the algorithm to correctly classify the transmitting device. To do so,
we perform two experiments. First, we evaluate the previously trained baseline
model on a test dataset where the transmissions were passed through the multipath
model. Next, we retrain the networks, replacing the training dataset with data that
has passed through the simulated multipath model, and reevaluate the performance
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on the multipath testing dataset. The first experiment will measure the impact that
the multipath environment has on the classifier when it is not accounted for. The
second experiment will assess whether the classifier can improve its results when the
distribution of multipath environments is known a priori and learned as part of the
training sequence.
5.3.4 Frequency-Shifted Signals
So far, we have synchronized the data prior to presentation to the network
so that the network would not learn device-specific center frequency offsets. This
was based on the assumption that an attacker could easily force a frequency-shift
in their device, serving as an easy way to fool a classifier that relies on such center
frequency offsets. For this experiment, we seek to validate that assumption. Here,
we do not synchronize the received signals prior to training the classifier. Since the
signals are not synchronized, the error signal is less meaningful, so the ideal signal
is not subtracted from the measured signal.
Next, we evaluate the performance of the classifier against other unsynchro-
nized transmissions from the set of known devices to measure how well these classi-
fiers can work against a user that simply uses another device. Finally, we evaluate
the classifier against transmissions from the withheld devices that were frequency-
shifted in software to the mean frequency offset of the particular known device for
that verification network. This simulates the effect of an unauthorized user pur-
chasing another device, measuring the frequency offset in the received transmissions
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from the trusted device, and shifting the center frequency of their device to try
to match that of the trusted device. Such an attack would clearly fail against a
classifier which synchronizes the transmissions first.
If a signal xa,imeas(t), corresponding to the i
th transmission from device a, could





then the signal xb,a,ishift(t), frequency-shifted to have the same frequency error as device





where θrand is a uniform random variable on [−π, π] due to the lack of phase syn-
chronization and ω̄b is the mean frequency offset computed over all transmissions in







where M is the number of transmissions in the training set belonging to device b.
5.3.5 Reduced-Memory Model
Finally, we seek to reduce the memory footprint of the trained models so
that IoT devices, which are typically inexpensive and low-power, can store a larger
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number of verification networks in their memory. In the naive approach, each
trained model would be individually stored in a device’s memory, requiring storage
of 258,969 unique parameters per model, despite every network having an identical
architecture. One approach to addressing this problem is to reuse as many param-
eters as possible from one network to the next via a transfer learning approach. To
achieve this, we retrain the networks all from the same initialization and disable
learning on selected parameters.
To begin, we select the best performing baseline model and initialize all net-
works to that model. Next, learning is disabled on the 128 × 19 and 32 × 15 con-
volution layers and the 128-node dense layer, forcing each network to use the exact
same values for those parameters. If there are D devices, this reduces the memory
required from 258, 969×D parameters to 258, 969 + 12, 921× (D − 1) parameters,
a 95% reduction in the limit as D → ∞. The motivation for this approach is that
since all verification networks are looking for similar sorts of patterns, it is likely
that the remaining free parameters within each model are enough to learn unique
features for each device.
5.4 Results and Discussion
The results of the experiments are shown in Table 5.2, where the mean ROC
and P-R AUC is reported at each SNR for each experiment, averaged across all
verification networks. As a comparison metric, we measure the distance of a clas-
sifier from the ideal classifier as 1 − AUC, where 0 represents the ideal value and
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1 corresponds to a classifier that is always incorrect. As compared to technique A,
technique B is said to be G% closer to an ideal classifier, where
G = 100× (1− 1− AUCB
1− AUCA
). (5.4)
For the baseline test, the performance greatly exceeds the results presented in
Chapter 4 as a result of the improved pre-processing sequence and the inclusion of
the LSTM layer to consider the entire signal at once, instead of only local informa-
tion in a single segment. Previously, verification networks with only seven devices
demonstrated P-R AUC of up to 0.9103 at high SNR, compared to 0.9713 demon-
strated here, a result that is 68% closer to the ideal classifier despite a significantly
larger population of devices. In addition, those results show less noise tolerance,
with only 0.8213 P-R AUC at 15 dB SNR, which is surpassed even by the 0 dB
SNR P-R AUC, 0.8354, shown here.
The trained networks clearly perform better when evaluated on the set of
known devices than the set of withheld devices, with P-R AUC that is 8.5% closer
to ideal at 0 dB SNR and 43.61% closer to ideal at 40 dB SNR. These results are
not surprising, as neural networks tend to perform best when presented with data
from a similar distribution to which they were trained on. Still, the results on the
withheld devices dataset show great promise for applying these techniques in the
real world to authenticate a single known device against a population of unknown














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similar results are obtained in the case of multipath, where classifiers trained
on signals without multipath effects perform substantially worse against signals
with simulated multipath effects than classifiers that included the multipath effects
in the training data. In this experiment, we measure a 12.73% improvement in P-R
AUC at 0 dB SNR and a 51.01% improvement at 40 dB SNR when including the
multipath effects in the set of signals used for training. Of course, the results are still
not quite as strong as the baseline classifier on signals recorded without multipath
effects. Still, this demonstrates that, as expected, the relatively tame multipath
effects experienced by these narrowband signals cause only minor degradation in
classifier performance, as long as they are accounted for during the training process.
The results of the synchronization test confirm our hypothesis that networks
trained on unsynchronized transmissions will depend on the frequency error in each
device as the primary feature for discrimination. These verification networks per-
form extremely well when evaluated against transmissions that are also unsynchro-
nized, with performance at low SNR far surpassing that of the baseline test. This is
to be expected, since a frequency offset in the baseband signal would persist at low
SNR. However, the performance decreases drastically when the transmissions in the
test set are frequency-shifted to match the positive class device, as given by Equa-
tion 5.2, with ROC AUC of only 0.7080 at 40 dB SNR and with 6/25 verification
networks performing worse than a classifier that guesses randomly.
Surprisingly, the results of the reduced memory model show improvement over
the baseline model in both the set of known and withheld devices. This is likely due
to the increase in total training time for the reduced memory model since the model
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with which it was initialized had already been through the entire training sequence.
This demonstrates that despite reducing the number of trainable parameters in the
model to only 5% of its original value, the network performance remains high.
Finally, the results of the experiment comparing the performance on the with-
held devices dataset as a function of the number of devices in the negative training
class are shown in Figure 5.5. From these plots, it is clear that the ability of the ver-
ification network to generalize and properly assign transmissions from new devices
to the negative class is directly related to the number of negative class devices seen
during training. This is intuitive, since the probability that a new device is more
similar to a negative class device than the positive class device increases with the
number of devices in the negative class.
5.5 Conclusion
We have demonstrated a series of enhancements for neural network techniques
for RF fingerprinting, particularly those that are geared towards IoT applications.
The enhancements to the pre-processing sequence as well as the addition of recurrent
components to the neural network model show significantly improved performance
over the technique presented in Chapter 4, particularly at low SNRs.
Furthermore, we have shown through experiments several important factors
which govern the performance of verification networks. First, we showed that the
performance can generalize to new devices provided that transmissions from a large
set of similar devices are included in the negative class during training. In addition,
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we showed that multipath effects from the sort of environment in which IoT devices
are typically used has a relatively minor impact on the performance, but only if a
similar set of multipath effects are seen in the transmissions during training. We also
demonstrated the importance of frequency synchronization of transmissions prior to
fingerprint extraction by showing that a network trained on unsynchronized trans-
missions becomes unreliable when presented with frequency-shifted signals. Finally,
we demonstrated a simple technique for reducing the memory requirements of a
library of trained models by up to 95% without any loss of performance.
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Withheld Set Performance as a Function of Negative Class Size
1 Negative Class Device
2 Negative Class Devices
4 Negative Class Devices
8 Negative Class Devices
16 Negative Class Devices
24 Negative Class Devices
(a) Receiver Operating Characteristic























Withheld Set Performance as a Function of Negative Class Size
1 Negative Class Device
2 Negative Class Devices
4 Negative Class Devices
8 Negative Class Devices
16 Negative Class Devices
24 Negative Class Devices
(b) Precision-Recall
Figure 5.5: The (a) ROC and (b) P-R AUC on the set of withheld devices for each
SNR as a function of the number of negative class devices included in the training
set.
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Chapter 6: Generative Adversarial Networks for Improved Security
in IoT RF Fingerprinting Systems
6.1 Introduction
The neural network techniques presented in Chapters 4 and 5 work well and
successfully defend against weak and intermediate adversaries due to the careful pre-
processing sequence which removes the effect of high-level easily-spoofed features,
such as absolute power level and exact center frequency. However, no effort has
been made in either of these techniques to mitigate the strong adversary that has
precise, sample-by-sample control over their output waveform. This is particularly
relevant due to recent work in image processing which has introduced vulnerabilities
in neural network models, namely, that by presenting them with carefully-crafted
input signals, they can be made to predict the incorrect class with high confidence
[105–107].
This chapter explores this vulnerability as it applies to the RF fingerprint-
ing problem. First, the GAN framework introduced by Goodfellow et al. [105] is
adapted for use within the RF fingerprinting context. This requires modifying the
optimization problem to accommodate typical RF constraints, such as bandwidth,
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power level, and bit error rate. Then, a GAN is trained to generate signals that
appear similar to those from a trusted device, and we demonstrate that an exist-
ing RF fingerprint classifier can be deceived by signals generated by the GAN. We
then show that by augmenting the training dataset of the classifier with samples
produced by an independent GAN, this vulnerability can be mitigated. This work
emphasizes the need for extensive training of RF fingerprinting algorithms with a
diverse set of both real and simulated transmitters.
Despite the impressive performance of neural network techniques for RF finger-
printing, we are aware of only one other application of adversarial machine learning
to the RF fingerprinting problem [108]. Our work is novel in that we modify the
framework of data augmentation GANs (DAGANs) [109] to allow a non-random
signal to be used as input to the generator network. Antoniou et al. presented the
DAGAN architecture to derive modified versions of an input image to increase the
amount of data available for training classifiers [109]. As opposed to standard GAN
models, in which the generator takes only a random vector as input, their generator
network requires an input image on which to impose changes. Our network model is
structured similarly to this model so that a non-random input signal may be used.
Like many neural network techniques, GANs were initially applied in the com-
puter vision domain, with applications such as generating new examples of handwrit-
ten digits and face images [6]. In follow-up work, Goodfellow et al. demonstrated
that adversarial examples generated by the addition of small, imperceptible tar-
geted noise to an input image, could force a high-confidence incorrect classification
by a trained classifier [105]. Kurakin et al. later showed that the effect of these
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seemingly imperceptible changes often persist even when the adversarial images are
printed and recaptured via another camera [106].
6.2 Methods
The GAN formulation introduced by Goodfellow et al. [6] is based on a two-



































where B is the mini-batch size, yk is the kth sample in the training dataset, zk is
the kth random vector, D is a function representing the discriminator, and G is a
function representing the generator.
The RF fingerprinting problem is framed slightly differently, as we seek to
generate not just any signal that could fool the discriminator, but only valid signals
that could be demodulated correctly. The use of the DSSS technique in IEEE
802.15.4 devices presents additional challenges, as only a subset of the possible
sequences of symbols are valid. Consequently, we develop a framework in which the
generator takes an ideal signal, modulated precisely as defined in the standard, and
imparts imperfections on the signal similar to those seen in the actual measured
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signals from that device.
This motivates the use of a network similar to the DAGAN model [109] which
generates transformed versions of an input image. However, their network first en-
codes the input signal in a lower-dimensional space before decoding back to the
original dimension. In our case, this was found to produce signals that were drasti-
cally different from the input signal and failed to demodulate correctly. As a result,
the dimensionality is maintained at each step in the generator network by avoiding
downsampling operations and by zero-padding convolution operations. Addition-
ally, the DAGAN network input image is a real image, while our algorithm first
transforms the real signal through demodulation and re-modulation to recover the
ideal signal. Such a transformation does not apply to image processing tasks where
there is no notion of an ideal image that can be recovered.
Because no two transmissions from the same transmitter are identical even if
the data contents match, a random vector input to the generator network provides
a source of randomness from which to generate different outputs even for the same
input signal.
Additional steps are taken in an attempt to minimize the differences between
generated and measured signals. Both signals are low-pass filtered to ensure that
only in-band effects are used for classification. Additionally, the signals are power
normalized by dividing them by the RMS of the amplitude signal. Mathematically,
we define function P as the cascade of these two processing steps. Finally, the ideal
signal is subtracted from each signal to produce the error signal, which has been
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Figure 6.1: The architecture of the proposed GAN system.
To handle these additional complications, and with an update to the original
cost functions to account for vanishing gradients [110], the optimization now seeks



















∥∥P (G(xk, zk))− xk∥∥2 ], (6.3)





























for some value of hyperparameter α which keeps the generated signals close enough
to the ideal signal to allow error-free demodulation, and where xk is the ideal input
signal. The system architecture is shown in Figure 6.1, and the training algorithm
is summarized in Algorithm 1.
At initialization, we aim for the distribution of values in the linearly projected
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random vector to approximately follow a standard normal distribution. The required
projection occurs by first computing v = Wr for trainable matrix W of dimension
34, 816×L, and random vector r of length L, then reshaping v to dimension 17, 408×
2 so that it is the same size as the ideal modulated input signal. If all elements ri
of vector r and the initial values wi,j of matrix W are independently drawn from

































4 . Since each vi is the sum of L independent
and identically distributed random variables, the Central Limit Theorem assures
that the distribution of each vi approaches the standard normal distribution as
L→∞. In practice, we use L = 10 and L = 20, but verify through simulation that
the distributions are well-approximated by the standard normal distribution.
Once the GAN is trained, a sample may be produced by the generator by
modulating a random bit pattern into ideal signal x, drawing a random vector z
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Input: A set of N transmissions {y1, y2, . . . , yN} recorded from the same
transmitter and synchronized to the receiver.
Algorithm:
for i← 1 to N do
xi ← modulate (demodulate (yi))
end
for i← 1 to 3, 000 do
for j ← 1 to 3 do
• Sample mini-batch of input samples: {x1, x2, . . . , xB}
• Sample mini-batch of noise samples: {z1, z2, . . . , zB}
• Update generator parameters via the Adam algorithm for



















∥∥∥P (G(xk, zk))− xk∥∥∥2 ]
end
• Sample mini-batch of input samples: {x1, x2, . . . , xB}
• Sample mini-batch of corresponding received transmissions:
{y1, y2, . . . , yB}
• Sample mini-batch of noise samples: {z1, z2, . . . , zB}
• Update discriminator parameters via the Adam algorithm for




























Algorithm 6.1: The proposed GAN training algorithm.
from unif(−a, a), and calculating P (G(x, z)).
To measure the effectiveness of this approach, we experimented with a set of
25 Digi XBP24CZ7SITB003 ZigBee PRO devices. From each device, 9,000 trans-
missions were downconverted to baseband and recorded at a sampling frequency
of 16 MHz. We train individual verification networks for each device using 3,000
transmissions with random data contents for training, validation, and testing of
each model using the architecture and technique described in Chapter 5. We will
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Layer Description Activation Parameters
Input B × 17, 408× 4 - -
Convolution 1D 64× 32 Tanh 8, 256
Convolution 1D 32× 25 Tanh 51, 232
Convolution 1D 4× 19 Tanh 2, 436
Convolution 1D 2× 16 Tanh 130
Output B × 17, 408× 2 - -
Table 6.1: The generator network architecture for GAN1.
show that these networks, trained exclusively on transmissions from real devices,
are insufficient at defending against adversarial examples produced by a GAN. We
then update the training protocol to protect against this shortcoming.
Next, we use another 3,000 transmissions per device to train, validate, and
test the proposed GAN algorithm using the generator and discriminator architec-
tures outlined in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. A mini-batch size of 1,024 transmissions was
used and training proceeded for 3,000 iterations, where an iteration includes alter-
nately training the generator for three mini-batches and the discriminator for one
mini-batch. Because the parameters of both the generator and discriminator are
constantly being updated in an effort to improve the performance relative to the
other, it is difficult to select an appropriate time to cease training and accept the
generator as sufficiently trained. To account for this, the model parameters are
saved every 50 iterations to allow the model to be reloaded at many different points
throughout training. To match the technique used by the classifier, the measured
transmissions are first synchronized to the receiver and trimmed so that only the
random payload portion of the signal is preserved.
For each device and each of the generator models saved after the first 2,000
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Layer Description Activation Parameters
Input B × 17, 408× 2 - -
Reshape B × 17× 1, 024× 2 - -
Convolution 1D* 32× 19 ELU 1, 248
Average Pool* Pool size = 2 - -
Convolution 1D* 16× 19 ELU 9, 744
Average Pool* Pool size = 2 - -
Flatten* B × 3, 872 - -
Dense* 32 nodes ELU 123, 936
Dropout* p = 0.5 - -
Dense* 16 nodes ELU 528
Dropout* p = 0.5 - -
Reshape B × 17× 16 - -
LSTM 24 nodes Tanh 3, 936
Dense 1 node Sigmoid 25
Output B × 1 - -
Table 6.2: The discriminator network architecture for GAN1. Layers marked with
an asterisk are performed individually on each of the 17 time segments.
iterations of training, we perform the following test. The verification network for
the device is loaded, and the positive class from the original testing set for that
network, corresponding to 300 real transmissions from that device at each SNR in
{0, 5, . . . , 40} dB, is assigned as the positive class. For the negative class, 300 trans-
missions are generated by the trained generator and AWGN is added at the same
SNRs as the positive class. All transmissions are low-pass filtered, power-normalized,
and converted to error signals, then presented to the verification network. For each
device, we save the results of the worst-performing model, corresponding to the stage
of training during which the generator was most effective. Prior to evaluating each
model, we generate and attempt to demodulate 300 transmissions from that model.
If any bit errors are detected in the demodulated signals, that model is discarded
and the results are not included.
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Layer Description Activation Parameters
Input B × 17, 408× 4 - -
Convolution 1D 64× 25 Tanh 6, 464
Convolution 1D 8× 17 Tanh 8, 712
Convolution 1D 2× 9 Tanh 146
Output B × 17, 408× 2 - -
Table 6.3: The generator network architecture for GAN2.
Finally, we seek to counteract this attack method by augmenting the verifi-
cation network training dataset with artificially-generated transmissions from the
generator network. In a realistic scenario, the GAN used to augment the training
dataset would not match the one used by the attacker. To model this difficulty,
we train a second GAN per device using the architectures in Tables 6.3 and 6.4.
This second GAN also uses different training data, different values of α, a different
low-pass filter, a random vector input of length 10 instead of 20, and a different
learning rate. Finally, the activation function on this GAN has been replaced with
the leaky rectified linear unit (ReLU) [111].
Next, we reload the trained verification network for each device and replace
half of the negative class samples from the training and validation datasets with
signals output from the generator network, uniformly sampled from models at all
stages of training in 50 iteration increments. We then fine-tune each of the verifica-
tion networks for ten epochs, saving the model which performs best on the validation
set. To demonstrate the benefit of augmenting the training procedure with a GAN,
we measure the performance of the retrained networks against the original trained
GANs. We will refer to the GANs used to evaluate the resilience of the trained ver-
ification networks as GAN1, and the GANs used to augment the training procedure
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Layer Description Activation Parameters
Input B × 17, 408× 2 - -
Reshape B × 17× 1, 024× 2 - -
Convolution 1D* 32× 25 Leaky ReLU 1, 632
Average Pool* Pool size = 2 - -
Convolution 1D* 16× 17 Leaky ReLU 8, 720
Average Pool* Pool size = 2 - -
Convolution 1D* 8× 15 Leaky ReLU 1, 928
Average Pool* Pool size = 2 - -
Flatten* B × 912 - -
Dense* 64 nodes Leaky ReLU 58, 432
Dropout* p = 0.5 - -
Dense* 16 nodes Leaky ReLU 1, 040
Dropout* p = 0.5 - -
Dense* 4 nodes Leaky ReLU 68
Dropout* p = 0.5 - -
Reshape B × 68 - -
Dense 8 nodes Leaky ReLU 552
Dense 1 node Sigmoid 9
Output B × 1 - -
Table 6.4: The discriminator network architecture for GAN2. Layers marked with
an asterisk are performed individually on each of the 17 time segments.
as GAN2, where GAN1 and GAN2 are trained individually per device.
All GAN training and evaluation is performed using TensorFlow [98]. Opti-
mization of the cost functions in Equations 6.3 and 6.4 is performed using the Adam
optimizer [96] with learning rates of 10−3 for GAN1 and 10−4 for GAN2.
6.3 Results and Discussion
Figure 6.2 shows an ideal network input signal, the corresponding signal mea-
sured from a real device, and the signal produced by the trained GAN1. These
images demonstrate that the GAN is able to transform the ideal input signal to one
that looks much more similar to the signals actually produced by the target device.
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Due to the random vector input to the generator, minor fluctuations occur in the
exact signal output from one run to the next even for the same ideal input signal.
Figure 6.3(a) shows average ROC curves at each SNR for the verification
networks trained exclusively on real transmissions, where the negative class corre-
sponds to transmissions from GAN1. The AUC is included in the legend for each
SNR. These ROC curves are computed by calculating the average value of the true
positive rate (TPR) for each possible value of the false positive rate (FPR) across
all devices. Since ROC curves inherently have jump discontinuities, we compute
the minimum and maximum value of TPR for each possible FPR and average these
values pointwise across all devices.
These curves indicate extremely poor performance at distinguishing real trans-
missions sent by the true positive class device from those created by GAN1, indicat-
ing a vulnerability of the verification network to this sort of attack. A classifier which
blindly guesses may achieve a ROC curve where TPR = FPR, and AUC = 0.5. The
curves generated here fall below that line for high values of FPR, and have AUC met-
rics which demonstrate extremely unreliable classification. The ROC AUC numbers
for each individual verification network evaluated against GAN1 indicate that 10/25
networks perform worse than random guessing at 0 dB SNR, and 9/10 of those net-
works also perform worse than random guessing at 40 dB SNR. This emphasizes the
need for methods to improve the robustness of existing RF fingerprinting techniques
against such attacks.
Figure 6.3(b) shows average ROC curves for the verification networks when
transmissions produced by GAN2 are used to augment the training dataset. These
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ROC curves indicate extremely strong performance at distinguishing real transmis-
sions produced by the target device from artificially generated signals. This exper-
iment demonstrates that GAN1 is able to produce transmissions that are realistic
enough to fool a neural network that has not been previously trained using a GAN,
but not realistic enough that discrimination becomes impossible or even difficult if
a GAN is used to augment training.
This result has important implications for neural network-based RF classifica-
tion systems. While these signals are artificially generated and not produced by a
real transmitter which would impose its own fingerprint on top of the desired signal,
it demonstrates a vulnerability in the trained networks which could potentially be
exploited by an attacker. The ability of the network to overcome this by training
on adversarial examples emphasizes the need for a training dataset with as much
diversity as possible to limit such vulnerabilities.
In particular, the ability of the GAN to learn to effectively fool the classifier
without hands-on access to it is noteworthy and demonstrates a serious shortcom-
ing in the training of these networks, one that is not apparent when performance
is assessed on real transmitters. While the training dataset and architecture of the
classifier and GAN discriminator are constructed similarly, the samples included
in each training dataset are different for both networks. In addition, the network
hyperparameters are unique for GAN1 and GAN2, and the parameters are initial-
ized and learned independently. The ability to mitigate this vulnerability using a
different GAN with a unique architecture, initialization, dataset, and hyperparam-
eters illustrates the need for greater attention to training data diversity and use
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of adversarial examples in the training process for systems designed for security
applications.
6.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have outlined how the GAN framework can be adapted
for use with RF signals and demonstrated via experiment how neural networks for
RF fingerprinting can be fooled by a GAN model. Furthermore, we have shown
that augmenting the training dataset with adversarial examples can strengthen the
neural network model against such attacks, effectively defending against a strong
adversary making sample-by-sample changes to their transmitted waveform.
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(a) Sample ideal signal











(b) Sample measured signal











(c) Sample generated signal
Figure 6.2: The real (blue) and imaginary (green) components of an example
(a) ideal signal, (b) measured signal, and (c) generated signal.
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 0 dB SNR (AUC=0.5613)
 5 dB SNR (AUC=0.6064)
10 dB SNR (AUC=0.6188)
15 dB SNR (AUC=0.6238)
20 dB SNR (AUC=0.6263)
25 dB SNR (AUC=0.6270)
30 dB SNR (AUC=0.6255)
35 dB SNR (AUC=0.6267)
40 dB SNR (AUC=0.6268)
(a) ROC without GAN-augmented training


















 0 dB SNR (AUC=0.9812)
 5 dB SNR (AUC=0.9917)
10 dB SNR (AUC=0.9960)
15 dB SNR (AUC=0.9972)
20 dB SNR (AUC=0.9969)
25 dB SNR (AUC=0.9969)
30 dB SNR (AUC=0.9968)
35 dB SNR (AUC=0.9968)
40 dB SNR (AUC=0.9968)
(b) ROC with GAN-augmented training
Figure 6.3: ROC curves to measure the ability to discriminate real transmissions
from the target device (positive class) from adversarial transmissions generated by
a GAN (negative class). (a) shows the results when GAN transmissions are not
included in the training set. (b) shows the results when GAN transmissions are
included in the training set.
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Chapter 7: Toward Receiver-Agnostic RF Fingerprint Verification
7.1 Introduction
So far, the techniques presented have all assumed that the receiver used for
training and evaluation of the RF fingerprint models is held constant. In a practical
application, a factory producing devices may record transmissions from each device
and train a fingerprint verification neural network to confirm the identity of that
particular device. However, when the model is deployed to another receiver in a
consumer’s network, a different RF front-end will be used to verify the fingerprint of
each transmission. As we show in this chapter, significant performance degradation
may occur if techniques to mitigate the differences between receivers are not used.
To counter this performance degradation, currently, every transmitter would have
to be recorded by each receiver for optimal performance. This, of course, does not
scale to IoT applications with billions of devices in use, so practical approaches for
mitigating the degradation are needed.
Despite the recent influx of new techniques to perform RF fingerprinting, work
to address receiver variability has been limited. Rehman et al. [112,113] and Ram-
sey et al. [114] showed that RF fingerprinting algorithms based on power spectral
density and amplitude/phase/frequency statistics, respectively, are practical to per-
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form using lower-cost USRPs as receivers instead of high-end lab equipment, with
a non-trivial performance penalty. However, their work assumed that a fingerprint
model was trained for each receiver, and did not evaluate the case where a trained
model was transferred for use with a different receiver.
Rehman et al. [115] demonstrated unacceptable performance degradation when
a fingerprint model is used with another receiver. Their work shows experimental
results when training a power spectral density-based classifier using a single low-end
or high-end receiver, then evaluating the trained classifier with six different low-end
receivers. They show that during inference, the classifier tends to nearly exclusively
assign transmissions to a single output class, regardless of the true class of the input
signal. Peng et al. [29] demonstrated significant, though less severe, performance
degradation for a neural network-based fingerprinting system, measuring more than
twice the error rate when inference is performed on another receiver. However,
the data collection with the second receiver was performed 18 months after the
training data collection, so the degradation due exclusively to the change in receiver
are unclear. None of the above approaches have proposed methods to reduce this
performance gap.
In this chapter, we demonstrate a technique to reduce the performance gap
between the receiver used for training and others. First, we confirm that the perfor-
mance of a neural network-based RF fingerprint verification system is suboptimal
when the receiver used for training and inference are different. We then demonstrate
that this performance gap can be reduced either by training with several physical
or simulated receivers, or by learning a simple ResNet [9] model per receiver to
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transform signals prior to classification.
7.2 Methods and Results
This section will show experimentally that performing training and inference
on different receivers causes significant degradation in classifier performance. Then,
we will outline an experiment to assess the impact of training using data recorded
on multiple receivers. Next, we propose a technique for learning a single transfor-
mation function per receiver which can be used to adapt the received signals for
fingerprinting before presentation to the network, and compare this to a simple LTI
model. Then, we combine the multi-receiver training regime with the transforma-
tion method to permit training with several virtual receivers in the presence of only
a single physical receiver. Finally, we will show that even if the receiver used for
training models and transformations is no longer available, that we can replace it
with another receiver using the described transformation method to maintain high
accuracy. All pre-processing and training of fingerprint verification networks follows
the techniques outlined in Chapter 5.
7.2.1 Data Collection
First, each ZigBee device is networked with another identical device, each in-
side of a separate sealed RF enclosure, with signals received by an antenna inside of
each enclosure. The signals are combined using a power splitter, and the resulting
time-series signal is downconverted to complex baseband and digitized at 16 MHz
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using each of the ten available receivers. This process is repeated for each transmit-
ter/receiver combination using 25 identical Digi XBP24CZ7SITB003 ZigBee trans-
mitters and ten receivers: one Rohde & Schwarz FSW67 signal and spectrum an-
alyzer, one Deepwave Digital artificial intelligence radio transceiver (AIR-T), and
eight Ettus Research X300 USRPs.
7.2.2 Effect of Changing the Receiver
To fully characterize the performance degradation introduced by changing re-
ceivers between training and inference, two measurements are required. First, we
measure the performance when training and inference are performed on the same
receiver for all transmitter/receiver combinations. Next, we use only the networks
trained on data recorded using a single receiver and perform inference using data
from each of the other receivers individually. For comparison, we measure the dis-
tance of each classifier at each SNR from the ideal classifier, or the difference between
the AUC and the ideal AUC of 1.0. Denoting the mean AUC of the ROC across
all transmitters for classifiers trained on receiver a and evaluated on receiver b at a
particular SNR as AUCSNRa,b , we say that the same-receiver case performs better by





Then, the average performance increase by using the same receiver for train-
ing and inference may be computed by averaging GSNRa,b over all evaluated receiver
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combinations. For this experiment, we use FSW67 as receiver a, and each of the
nine remaining receivers as receiver b, then average the results of each of the nine
GSNRa,b values at each SNR across receivers. Note that for all experiments, only 20
ZigBee devices are used for evaluation, as five devices are withheld to learn the
transformation functions. The results are shown in Table 7.1.
SNR (dB)
Mean ROC AUC
Diff. Receiver Same Receiver
Mean Improvement(%)
0 0.8558 0.8708 10.35
5 0.9311 0.9480 24.37
10 0.9582 0.9761 42.32
15 0.9639 0.9862 60.24
20 0.9667 0.9892 65.71
25 0.9656 0.9900 69.05
30 0.9651 0.9907 71.45
35 0.9667 0.9899 67.57
40 0.9644 0.9903 70.83
Table 7.1: The AUC ROC at each SNR averaged over nine receivers, considering
both the case where the same receiver and different receivers were used for training
and inference. Additionally, the mean improvement when using the same receiver
is calculated using Equation 7.1.
From the results, it is clear that significant classifier performance degradation
occurs when training and inference are performed using different receivers. The
same-receiver setup achieves 70.83% better performance than the different-receiver
setup in the 40 dB SNR case, and 10.35% better performance in the 0 dB SNR case.
There is a strong upward trend, with the performance improvement typically being
stronger at higher SNRs. This is partially due to the use of relative metrics, with
the performance at lower SNRs being lower to begin with. Still, there is a clear,
significant performance penalty associated with changing receivers.
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7.2.3 Multi-Receiver Training
One obvious way to attempt to overcome this issue is by using recordings from
a diverse set of receivers to train the fingerprint models. Unfortunately, receivers
are typically expensive, and coordinating data collection from a large number of
receivers is a complex task, so the application of this technique will typically be
limited to a small number of receivers.
In this experiment, we retrain each of the fingerprint models for each of the 20
devices using {2, 3, . . . , 9} receivers. The total size of the training and validation sets
are held constant, and the data is taken approximately evenly from each receiver
used for training. After training, we measure the performance of each model on
signals recorded from all 20 devices on the remaining receivers. Finally, we compute





where A is now a set of receivers used for training, b is each individual receiver used
for inference, and A1 denotes the first element in A, or the FSW67 receiver used for
single-receiver training. This metric is computed for each receiver b, b /∈ A, and then
the mean is taken. The results are shown in Table 7.2, and indicate that training
with multiple receivers significantly improves the generalizability of the fingerprint





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In the best case, at 40 dB SNR, 65.65% improvement is noted by training on
nine receivers. At lower SNRs, the results are much less consistant, with a best case
improvement at 0 dB SNR of 14.43% measured using only two receivers. Comparing
the mean improvement numbers in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, we see that at high SNRs,
training with nine receivers provides only slightly less improvement over the different
receiver case than training and testing on the same receiver. This demonstrates that
training on multiple receivers improves the generalization at high SNRs. However, at
lower SNRs, the benefits achieved with multi-receiver training are inconsistent and
often fall short of the improvements achieved when training on the same receiver.
7.2.4 Learning Neural Network Receiver Transformations
While the performance of the multi-receiver training protocol is promising, it
requires dedicating a large number of potentially costly receivers strictly to training,
and also involves additional complexity in controlling and gathering data from all
of the receivers simultaneously. As an alternative, we seek solutions in which the
fingerprint models can be trained using only a single receiver, with a learned trans-
formation on the inference receiver to adjust the signals it receives in an attempt to
improve classification performance. In this model, signals would be recorded on the
inference receiver, pre-preprocessed as before, transformed using the learned func-
tion, then presented to the fingerprint models trained using only a single receiver.
For this technique, we model our transformation as a ResNet [9]. In this
manner, the transformed signal is simply the input signal plus some additive term
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which is a function of the input signal, or
xout = xin + f(xin). (7.3)
where xout is the transformed output signal, xin is the pre-processed received signal,
and f(.) is a function learned by the neural network.
The ResNet model is intuitive for this application, since the transformed out-
put signal can be expected to be very close to the input signal given that distor-
tions in each receiver should be relatively small. The network architecture is shown
in Table 7.3. Note that the normalization stage also includes RMS scaling and
mean/variance scaling. Truncation of the leading samples is used so that signals are
compatible with the lengths used in the verification networks, while the longer in-
put signals are useful to avoid zero-padding the convolutions. Finally, note that the
input signal is not an error signal, but the pre-processed signal prior to subtracting
the estimated ideal signal.
To train the transformation layers, we propose the scheme shown in Figure
7.1. In this case, we reserve a set of five transmitters to be used solely for the
transformation learning process. The fingerprint models are trained for these five
devices using the techniques described in Chapter 5 using a single receiver, in this
case FSW67. Then, signals from all five devices are passed through each of the
five networks, and for each signal, the output distribution over all five networks
is normalized to sum to one and saved. We denote this output distribution as
p = [p1, p2, . . . , p5]. Next, signals recorded on the target receiver are passed through
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Layer Configuration Activation # Param.
Input 18, 432× 2 — —
Convolution 1D 64× 32 ELU 4, 160
Gaussian Noise σ = 0.15 — —
Convolution 1D 32× 25 ELU 51, 232
Gaussian Noise σ = 0.15 — —
Convolution 1D 4× 19 ELU 2, 436
Gaussian Noise σ = 0.15 — —
Convolution 1D 2× 16 None 130
Add Skip connection to input — —
Normalization Produce error signal — —
Truncation Discard leading samples — —
Output 17, 408× 2 — —
Table 7.3: The architecture of the transformation network. Note that the estimated



















Signals from Original Receiver
Normalize DistributionNormalize Distribution
Figure 7.1: A diagram illustrating the procedure for learning a transformation func-
tion to map signals recorded on a new receiver to signals recorded on the training
receiver. A set of five transmitters are used for calibration between the two receivers.
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the trainable transformation network, then each of the five fixed fingerprint models,
and finally normalized. We denote this distribution as p̂ = [p̂1, p̂2, . . . , p̂5].
If the transformation is perfect, we would expect the aggregate distributions
output from each network to be quite similar for signals from the same transmitting
device and at the same SNR. To compare distributions, we used the Kullback-
Leibler divergence as the loss function, which we backpropagate back through the
fixed transformation networks and into the trainable transformation layer to enable
learning. The Kullback-Leibler divergence is defined as







and is used as a measure of similarity between probability distributions. By min-
imizing this measure, we ensure that the distribution of outputs from the original
receiver and the transformed new receiver are similar.
Note that during data collection, each receiver recorded different signals from
each device. As such, we cannot simply assign the target probability distribution
from a transmission on one receiver to that of the corresponding transmission on the
original receiver. Instead, we randomly select a transmission from the same device
and at the same SNR from the original receiver, and use that distribution as the
target probability distribution for the training and validation datasets.
During the training process, we use 2,400 transmissions for training and 300
transmissions for validation from each of the five transmitter devices recorded on
both the original and new receiver. Training proceeds for three epochs, and the
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model with the highest ROC AUC on the validation dataset is saved as the trans-
formation model for that receiver. `2 activity regularization with a weight of 10−5 is
included on the final convolution layer to encourage adjustment to the input signal
to be small.
To evaluate the performance of the learned transformation function, we con-
sider a similar metric to Equations 7.1 and 7.2. However, based on the assumption
that the optimal transformation would yield performance equivalent to models that
are trained and evaluated on the same receiver, in this case, we measure the dis-
tance from the same-receiver classifier, instead of the ideal classifier. The resulting





where b′ indicates receiver b combined with the learned transformation for that
receiver.
The average results for each receiver across all 20 fingerprint models at each
SNR are shown in Table 7.4. From the results, it is clear that the transformation
functions significantly improve classification performance across receivers. We mea-
sure a mean improvement of 50.11% in the 40 dB SNR case, and a mean improvement
of 32.09% in the 0 dB SNR case, indicating that 50.11% and 32.09%, respectively, of
the difference in performance between the same-receiver and different-receiver cases








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As a final comparison of the proposed method, we model the transformation
from one receiver to another as a LTI system such that
xa[n] = xb[n] ∗ h[n], (7.6)
where xa[n] and xb[n] denote that signals, indexed by n, recorded on receivers a and
b, respectively, h[n] denotes the impulse response, and ∗ denotes convolution.
We then fit the impulse response h[n] of the transformation using the following
technique. First, we split the device output signal using a power splitter so that
the same signal could be recorded on FSW67 and the worst-performing remaining
receiver, in this case, X300-8. We pre-process signals from both receivers using the
same process as before, but excluding the error signal generation and mean/variance
scaling, then stack the signals from FSW67 into vector y, and form matrix X =
[x0 x1 . . . xN−1], where xi is produced by stacking the corresponding signals recorded
on X300-8 and shifting by i samples. Finally, we select the select the impulse
response as
h = argminh‖y −Xh‖, (7.7)
where N = 200 was found to produce the best results for this experiment.
The results comparing the linear transformation to the proposed transforma-
tion, as well as the same-receiver case and different-receiver case with no trans-
formations, are shown in Figure 7.2 for the particular case of 40 dB SNR. From
these results, it is clear that the proposed transformation is superior to both the
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case with the linear transformation and the case with no transformation. Note that
the difference is especially pronounced at relatively low values of the FPR, where a
typical RF fingerprint classification system is likely to operate. At every SNR, the
proposed transformation demonstrates superior performance, with the linear trans-
formation achieving 6.48% improvement at 0 dB SNR and 33.96% improvement at
40 dB SNR, with a maximum of 37.20% improvement at 25 dB SNR, calculated
using Equation 7.5. At the same SNRs, the proposed transformation achieves im-
provements of 40.46%, 64.49%, and 57.34%, respectively.




















Different Receiver, Proposed Transformation
Different Receiver, Linear Transformation
Different Receiver, No Transformation
Figure 7.2: The average ROC curve at 40 dB SNR computed across all 20 devices on
X300-8 for four cases, including training and testing on the same receiver and differ-
ent receivers with each of the following configurations: the proposed transformation,
the linear transformation, and no transformation.
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7.2.5 Multi-Receiver Training with Virtual Receivers
The results of Section 7.2.3 illustrate the clear benefit to using multiple re-
ceivers during the training process. Unfortunately, this benefit comes at increased
financial cost, since additional receivers must be purchased and maintained. Ad-
ditionally, the data collection process becomes substantially more complex, since
numerous receivers must be controlled, and the data from all receivers must be
aggregated to build a training dataset. These additional complications motivate
the use of virtual receivers instead of physical ones. Using the transformations
outlined in Section 7.2.4, we propose collecting data on a single physical receiver,
transforming the received signal to representations more like several other receivers,
and combining these transformed signals into a single dataset to train a fingerprint
model. This solution is depicted in Figure 7.3.
In order to train the transformation functions, temporary access to other phys-
ical receivers is necessary. However, once these transformations are learned, only
a single physical receiver is required. This provides a clear benefit, since the re-
maining receivers may be rented temporarily and do not need to be maintained.
Additionally, this setup simulates the virtual receivers in software, so that only a
single physical receiver is used to collect data, permitting a simple data collection
process. Finally, this technique places the computational burden of using transfor-
mations on the training side, removing the need for transformations to be used for
inference.
Following the steps of Section 7.2.4, we train three transformation functions
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Fixed





Signals from Receiver a
Fixed
a → e 
Transform
Trainable Fingerprint Model
Error Signal Generation, Normalization
Figure 7.3: The proposed system for training the fingerprint models using a single
physical receiver, a, and three virtual receivers, c, d, and e.
to map the FSW67 receiver to the AIR-T, X300-1, and X300-2 receivers. Next, the
weights of the fingerprint model are initialized to the weights trained for a verification
network for one of the five withheld transmitters used for calibration. Note that
these verification networks on the set of five calibration devices are already trained,
since they are required to learn the transformation functions for each receiver. The
neural network structure in Figure 7.3 is then used to train the fingerprint models,
with training disabled on the transformation weights.
Training proceeds as in Chapter 5, except 10% of the training dataset from
FSW67 is randomly replaced with data selected uniformly from the virtual receivers.
All other training hyperparameters are held constant.
To evaluate this technique, data from the remaining receivers, namely X300-3
through X300-8, is used to calculate the ROC AUC for each of the 20 fingerprint
models for each receiver. These are the exact same datasets that were used to calcu-
late the performance in Section 7.2.2 where training and inference were performed
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on different receivers. The results are shown in Table 7.5, and indicate significant
performance improvement over the case using only a single physical receiver, par-
ticularly at lower SNRs. At 0 dB SNR, we observe a 29.08% mean improvement,
and at 40 dB SNR, we observe a 10.24% mean improvement, over the single training
receiver case.
Interestingly, these results indicate a greater benefit to using multiple virtual
receivers than multiple physical receivers in the 0 dB and 5 dB SNR cases. Addi-
tionally, comparing mean ROC AUC numbers, one notices that this method also
provides higher performance in the 0 dB and 5 dB SNR cases than the learned
transformation functions in nearly all cases. At higher SNRs, however, additional
physical receivers and learned transformation functions provide greater performance.
We hypothesize that this occurs at the lower SNRs because the noise makes it more
difficult for the network to learn patterns in the data, which is assisted by show-
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































7.2.6 Training without the Original Receiver
The transformation method in Section 7.2.4 makes the implicit assumption
that all fingerprint models are trained using the same receiver, and all devices used
for inference learn a transformation function to that original receiver. One might
imagine a scenario where a factory producing transceivers records transmissions from
each device to train a fingerprint model for that device, then the new transceiver
records the five transmitters used for calibration, and a transformation function to
the training receiver is learned. The problem with this approach is that if the orig-
inal receiver later becomes unavailable, perhaps lost or damaged, future fingerprint
models will have to be trained on a different receiver, invalidating the transforms
on existing devices.
One possible solution to this problem is to use a transformation function to
map signals recorded on the new training receiver to the original training receiver,
and to then treat the newly transformed receiver as if it were the original. At
inference time, the devices will behave as if this switch never occurred, using the
original transformation function to the now broken receiver, and the fingerprint
models trained using the transformed new receiver.
This approach is shown in Figure 7.4. Note that the c→ a transformation can
be learned for new receiver c even after receiver a is no longer available, as long as
signals recorded using receiver a from each of the five calibration devices have been
saved and those five devices are still available to be recorded by receiver c.
We tested this approach experimentally, using AIR-T as receiver c and learn-
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Signals from Receiver c
Trainable Fingerprint Model
Error Signal Generation, 
Normalization
Fixed c → a Transformation 
Figure 7.4: The proposed method for training new fingerprint models after the
original receiver, a, is no longer available and is replaced by receiver c.
ing the c → a transformation as described in Section 7.2.4. Next, we retrained
fingerprint models for each of the 20 transmitters using the procedure outlined in
Chapter 5, except with the transformed AIR-T receiver. In an effort to train fin-
gerprint models that are as similar as possible to the ones that would be produced
using the original receiver, FSW67, we initialize the weights in each model prior to
training to the weights from a fingerprint model developed using the original receiver
and one of the five devices for calibration.
To evaluate this technique, we use the same datasets as for the experiments in
Section 7.2.4, transform the signals for each X300 receiver using the transformation
to FSW67, and perform inference using the newly trained fingerprint models. As a
comparison, we measure the improvement over the case where training is performed
using AIR-T and inference is performed using each particular receiver, which means
that the alternative is simply to disable the transformation to FSW67 on each
receiver and use the models trained on AIR-T. We can measure the improvement






where training receiver a is replaced with receiver c, or AIR-T, b′ indicates receiver
b transformed to receiver a, or FSW67, and c′ indicates receiver c transformed to
receiver a.
The results of the experiment are shown in Table 7.6. Note that in nearly all
of the 0 dB and 5 dB SNR cases, the performance of the new technique exceeded
the performance of the case where training and inference were performed using
the same receiver without any transformations. In this case, the interpretation of
Equation 7.8 breaks down, so these entries are simply denoted with an asterisk.
We hypothesize that a minor denoising effect is performed by the transformation
network, permitting higher performance in the lower SNR cases than is achieved
when training without a transformation in place.
At the remaining SNRs, performance is impressive, achieving a maximum
mean improvement of 57.06% at 10 dB SNR and a mean improvement of 41.92%
in the 40 dB SNR case. Compared to the results in Table 7.4, which indicate
performance when models are learned on the original, untransformed receiver and
where we note 56.23% improvement at 10 dB SNR and 50.11% improvement at 40 dB
SNR, we note that these results are quite promising. While the model performance
is impacted by replacing the original training receiver with another, transformed
receiver, the resulting performance is a significant improvement over the case where





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In this chapter, we demonstrated that RF fingerprint verification network per-
formance is negatively impacted when the receiver used for training and testing are
different. We proposed and evaluated several techniques for overcoming this short-
coming. The first technique simply trains the verification networks on signals from
several receivers. This technique demonstrates significant performance improvement
at high SNR, but inconsistent, yet mostly positive, improvement at low SNR. Next,
we demonstrated a calibration procedure whereby a neural network transformation
is learned for each receiver and used with verification networks trained on another
receiver. This technique is able to reduce the performance gap introduced by testing
on a new receiver by between 32.09% and 62.99% depending on SNR, and eliminates
the scaling issue introduced by training a new model for every transmitter/receiver
pair.
We then demonstrate additional experiments using the proposed transforma-
tion functions. First, we show that increased generalization over single-receiver
training may be achieved by using the transformation functions to simulate addi-
tional receivers, even when only a single physical receiver is used for data collection.
Then, we demonstrate that the transformation functions may be used during the
training process to replace the original receiver with another in the event that the
original receiver is no longer available.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion
In this dissertation, we have developed several successful deep learning tech-
niques for the RF fingerprinting problem and demonstrated them on a set of com-
mercial ZigBee devices. The first part of our work develops a framework for which
to derive the estimated error signal for a received transmission, then trains CNNs
to classify the error signals by the predicted device. The second part builds upon
the first and utilizes RNN components and an improved pre-processing sequence to
improve the performance of the technique, particularly at lower SNRs, and also per-
forms several experiments to measure the success of the technique against potential
realistic scenarios. The third part develops a GAN framework for which to generate
artificial signals, and shows that using a GAN to provide supplementary training
examples for the classifiers provides additional protection against these adversarial
examples. The final contribution of our work investigates the ability to transfer a RF
fingerprint model from one receiver to another, and develops a calibration procedure
whereby the front-end of the evaluation receiver can be mapped to the front-end of
the training receiver using a neural network model, improving upon the performance
of a fingerprint model that is blindly transferred without compensation.
A number of future directions for this work remain. First, an analysis of the
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stability of an RF fingerprint model over time and through temperature and voltage
fluctuations is important. While the techniques presented here work well, they are
limited to transmitters that have been measured in a somewhat fixed environment
and do not account for any time-varying effects that occur slowly relative to the
capture length of each recording, such as temperature deviation in the environment.
IoT devices are also typically battery-operated, and an investigation into any possi-
ble changes that develop as battery levels decrease are necessary before a practical
implementation of such techniques. Tekbaş et al. performed experiments to show
that a transient-based fingerprinting technique degrades significantly as a result of
either battery voltage or temperature deviation, but also showed that including
these deviations in the training set allows the algorithm to regain nearly all of the
lost performance [116]. It would be useful to verify whether a similar performance
degradation may be seen in neural network fingerprinting models, and determine
if including such variability in the training set is sufficient to compensate for such
effects.
Second, techniques aimed at reducing the time-complexity of neural network
fingerprinting algorithms are needed. Near real-time inference using the proposed al-
gorithms may be attainable using high-performance workstations with several GPUs,
but resources are typically much more limited in the IoT domain. The contin-
ued improvement of deep learning software packages and the development of new
hardware platforms geared towards neural network applications may also enhance
performance.
Finally, additional techniques to evaluate what has been learned by a particular
119
neural network model are critical to their increased use within the security domain.
Given the nature of security applications, explainable algorithms are strongly de-
sired as they allow an understanding of the limitations and possible exploitations of
a particular approach. Furthermore, such a development could permit algorithms
whereby domain-specific attributes are intentionally encoded into the network, al-
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